Sheepish About Hitler and clever generals

Not once remarked that in his memoirs, the German generals very carefully separate themselves from Hitler, strongly arguing that it was he, and only he perceived silly strategic and operational solutions, while all the generals (especially the creator of the next regular memoirs) knew in advance how to beat the directions in which to advance, when and how. And it is they, they say, in every way justify Hitler and assured him. But he does, silly, not listening, but if I listened, it all went very differently and the victory would have remained behind Germany.

Naturally, as the highest military Managing in the defeat of Hitler povinet more than anyone else, as the last word always belonged to him. It bore the burden of making a final decision. And if Germany lost the war, in itself allegation of incompetence does not ask for proof of Hitler.

But for all that generals memoirs somehow forgets that Stalin was not a military professor, and in the conduct of the war was less competent, if Hitler, who, though gefrayterom, but still smelled gunpowder in the First World War. It is possible in some measure to assume that Hitler was compensated incompetence incompetence of Stalin. Well, in general, a lot of history knows whether the new senior municipal managers who could be outstanding military spices? French Prime Minister Reynaud's never been a military. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, too. The head of the British government and Winston Churchill, although he graduated from the Military Institute, a military career, but did not, and therefore no practical knowledge had not. Interestingly out: military incompetence heads the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union ultimately did not prevent successful war, but for some reason prevented the Fuhrer.

But claims of broken generals and field marshals that if solutions Hitler perceived on the basis of their beliefs, the victory would have been undeniable, it is impossible to deny just as the fight unfolded not on their scenarios.

Unfortunately, real life and war — It is not computer games when you can play the first battle of one embodiment, later on another, and a third for sure then say decision 1st player was wrong and the other right.

And yet all have reason to believe that the ideas and suggestions of German generals far have not always been faithful and promised success.

Take the first thing a military solution to the introduction of Hitler's troops into the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936. The generals together justify that this act will cause momentary military response of France and Great Britain, they immediately invade the Rhineland and thrown out of the feeble German. But we now know that Hitler was right, but not the generals. The militarization of the Rhineland took place without a hitch. As can be seen, the right thing in this case, Hitler did not listen to his own generals. It was the right decision, not the generals fear.

Anschluss of Austria in 1938. Once again alarmed the generals justified Hitler unreasonableness of this solution, predicting big international burdening right to attack the allies against Germany. The result? World peace with the accession of Austria to Germany. Once again, Hitler was right, not his outstanding military strategists.

Well, that was the least of the military-political decisions, and basically political.

But that's a purely political-military decision to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. The country then had a very strong army, plus it was in a military alliance with France, England, Poland, and even with the Soviet Union. General Wehrmacht Beck even submitted a memorandum in which argued that this act will cause the Allied war against Germany, which the Germans did not survive. With the consent of the general meeting of top military control this memorandum was officially focused Hitler. And after all that? Once again, Hitler was right, but not the generals. World peace with rejection from Czechoslovakia much of its terrain.

Let's say that in this case the decision was primarily military-political, not military, and that the generals are not very competent. Although the military strategy as a science lies on the border nezapyatannoy nezapyatannoy policy and war. All strategic decisions is the essence of the military-political.

Next, March 15, 1939 the Wehrmacht invaded Czechoslovakia and occupied it. It is purely an act of war. According to the views of the German generals, the decision to invade Czechoslovakia necessarily lead to a major war in Europe, as a result of which Germany would be defeated. After Poland definitely stated that it would support Czechoslovakia. Russian divisions are pulled to the border in readiness immediately come to the aid of the Czechs in their first request, as will the consent of the Polish government to permit Russian troops through their areas (in 1939, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did not have a common border).

Again, it turns out that the concepts and calculations of the German strategists are wrong and wrong. The operation is completed with great success. Again, the solution turns out to be true to Hitler.

The war with Poland. Yes, the prophecy of the German generals that the attack on Poland would lead to a major war in Europe finally came true. France and Britain declared war on Germany. But again, the action unfolded in 1939 not because it counted excellent German field marshal, but because it meant Hitler was ignorant. Poland was defeated in a matter of weeks, and its war allies are only identified, but in fact no action is taken.

You should not delineate further action 1940-1941, right up to December 6, 1941, when each time the generals fear proved unfounded, and all developed the best way to Germany in accordance with the plans of Hitler.

The next proposition.

Hitler, as though no other country manager, did not take the decision and did not give orders, based only on their own ideas, thinking and calculations. He consulted with his ministers, generals, sought to calculate different variants of war, battles, requested the initial data, figure out what it takes to of success. Of course, the final decision perceived Hitler, but on the basis of the data it represented the generals.

When the generals to write memoirs about their own disputes with Hitler, somehow cleverly avoid the question, and on what basis, Hitler took more than their proposed solution? Just out of personal stubbornness? Almost. It is not hard to imagine that on the table and went straight to the Fuhrer back view emanating from other equally high-ranking generals and opponents of Hitler could not impressive to prove a point. In other words, in making wrong decisions Hitler large fraction guilty of the same German generals.

This is supported by the German historian A. Filippi, who in his book "Pripyat problem" describes the process of development and adoption of German war plans. For example, the development of the plan to attack the Soviet Union began with the fact that the Chief of General Staff of the Army General Halder Wehrmacht immediately offered several generals to create sketches of the plan. In the end, had three more promising plan. First — the development of IPOs, second plan — General Marx and 3rd — General von Zodershterna. Any one of them had positive and negative points. Note that all three plans have been proposed senior German generals. And you can only choose one. A similar system operates and the development of every military campaign the Wehrmacht.

It is not difficult to understand, he was born after the war, the thesis of the military incompetence of Hitler.

The scheme is: a campaign plan number
1 offer general X and Y. general Hitler accepts the plan, General X — campaign lost. In the post-war memoirs General Y impressive explains that if his plan was adopted, the campaign would have been just won. Gen. X in his memoirs, timidly silent, that losing campaign it was planned.

Take a campaign plan now number 2. Everything is changing in some places, when Hitler takes the general plan of Y — the campaign is lost. It is now in the post-war memoirs Gen. X impressively explains that if his plan was adopted, the campaign would have been just won. Gen. Y in his memoirs, timidly silent, that a losing campaign was planned by them.

And what is the result? And it is such: lost two campaigns and the light had two memories in each of which the creators point out that in both cases the silly Hitler did not listen to his own generals. The fact that a 2-cases, one of the generals of the potentially was right and the other a priori wrong, once out of sight of the reader slips.

By concentrating all your attention to the differences with Hitler's own memoirs in stripes artfully mostly ignored the facts and any of their performances, which are fully or partially coincided with Hitler.

They say that in a dispute born truth. That's just how it recognize when a mistake is dressed in the same clothes. Be sure that the incorrect and wrong decisions that led to the crash, Hitler made on the basis of guesses and calculations of the same field marshals. So read on their own outstanding talent and mediocrity Hitler broken generals would not be worth, especially because upon careful consideration of the events of that time their own tragic mistakes and blunders are quite perceptible. They do not hide behind chatter excellent descriptions of success and victories in 1941-1942. Especially since they ultimately led to a crushing defeat of the entire country.

Yu Veremeev "Red Army first second World War", Penguin Books Method, 2010

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