Arguments in favor of the appearance in the Russian Navy aircraft carriers

Arguments in favor of the appearance in the Russian Navy aircraft carriers

Vorachivayas relating to the development of the Russian navy, does not work to evade the question of naval aviation, and her home in the sea. USS — one of the most difficult component of the fleet and its construction and operation — labor intensive and overhead. For this reason, the construction of new aircraft carriers — not one of the most intimate perspectives. But there are preconditions for which Russian fleet came (not the smallest way) to realize the need of aircraft carriers. There are prerequisites for which the new Russian fleet will inevitably move in this direction.

When it comes to brand-new Russian aircraft carrier, almost always skeptical part of opponents, not counting the price of Rezonit construction and operation, as the absence to date of locations (these difficulties are solved), provides conceptual arguments. Specifically: goals and objectives for the carrier to our fleet absent can be fully make strong fleet without him; combat survivability of aircraft carrier and makes small «floating airfield» vulnerable to weapons and aircraft carriers in the experience of implementing the second world war is outdated and not «should prepare for war in the mid of the last century.»

The most common worldview, including pochetaemyh creators such aircraft carrier — it means anger against the backward and remote «Papuans,» we do not need it, as we attack anyone not going. Fun, but it’s the same word, which took advantage of opponents in the Soviet Union aircraft carrier — «a tool of aggression.» Such an outlook is not allowed us to have these carriers in the 60’s. Russian top political control is not very well represented puzzles aircraft carrier in the fleet and also believed that the carrier needed to conduct military operations in someone else’s coast. And as the Russian Alliance anyone is going to attack, then they do not need to build.
I think a similar conclusion would be obvious if observe the actions of the U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) in recent years. Latin American carriers are always in sight, and are virtually the only source of knowledge about this kind of weapons. Meanwhile, built the world’s only true carrier fleet is not for colonial wars, and to counter the Russian fleet in the oceans, isolation and destruction in its home bases. Percussion operations against the coast needed only during the «peripheral conflicts cool war» and were perceived as the main function, just when it seemed that the disappearance of Russian Union eliminated the main enemy fleet non-military ways. The necessity of aircraft in combat operations at sea impressively substantiated Yankees experience second World War.

Russian military science school also recognized the need for naval aviation based not only on coastal airfields, and specifically in the sea. The middle 50s planned to divide the functions of aircraft carriers for strike missions and providing air defense and anti-submarine (ASW and air defense) compounds ships. In 1955 he was ready to light conceptual design of an aircraft carrier at 40-50 aircraft in 1959, two aircraft carriers to project 60 and 100 aircraft. But implementation plans in life did not work because of the rapid development of rocket technology, which caused the revision of the concept of introducing fleet. The main directions of development of three steel fleet, namely: anti-submarine (SSBN fighting) protivoavianosnoe (using surface and submarine forces and naval aviation) and SSBNs (ballistic missile submarine carriers provided with all available forces of the fleet). Americans also continued postwar line where the main striking force of the fleet were carriers that were supposed to destroy enemy naval forces at sea and in the databases. Their main function is entrusted PLO in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Freeboard ships assigned to the same main function escort aircraft carriers.

The ability to develop these concepts for naval forces confronting each other, constantly analyzed. For example, in 1972, was carried out research work under the code «Order», the conclusion of which was: «Aviation is the main provision of the Navy, an urgent task, as they relate to matters of naval strategic nuclear forces; without air cover in the criteria for the rule of ASW aircraft possible enemy we can not provide not only combat stability, and deployment of our submarines with ballistic missiles as well as multi-purpose, which are the main striking force of the Navy; without fighter protection activities are not successful naval missile-carrying, reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft land-based — the second most important component of the shock of the Navy; impossible without fighter cover more or less applicable combat stability of surface ships. » (From the book doctor, Captain 1st rank V.D.Dotsenko «history of naval warfare.») In other words, resistance to carrier fleet without its sea-based aviation is difficult.

Like this all-encompassing studies conducted earlier, led to a renewed Russian Navy aircraft carrier applets. The dominance in the country’s top leadership idea of ​​aircraft carriers, as an instrument of anger is not allowed to go to research the concept of introduction of aircraft carriers with shock function. From the initial developments it has been excluded. But even remaining function — providing naval forces planned to solve limited measures. Thus was born the languid Russian aircraft carriers (TAVKR). Study the combat effectiveness of their first series, which had only armed helicopters and aircraft vertical takeoff and landing, and led to the emergence of the first true (despite the same notation — TAVKR) 11435 aircraft carrier project «Riga», now «Admiral Kuznetsov» and a sister, but unfinished «Varyag» (now «Shi Lang» as part of the PLA Navy). Enlargement project was due to the necessity organize quite a huge number of aircraft for the effectiveness of their support. And also to the fact that weather conditions waters introduction of aircraft carriers, do not allow his small displacement — takeoff and landing in rough seas likely only a large ship. Say, Americans, with the largest ships of this class, soar and sit with 7 points.

Those who reads the «Kuznetsov», as «defective aircraft carrier» is not right. Difficulties in establishing Russian steam catapult to launch aircraft from the deck, brought in as a temporary measure to springboard start. He suddenly led to additional advantages in the form of lower technical difficulty and the ability to take off in freezing temperatures. The presence of anti-ship missiles «Granit» (during future upgrades will be changed more modern complex), only increases the ability of an aircraft carrier battle orders, allowing the use of this instrument with its over-the-horizon air cover and guidance. Absence on board distant radar detection (AWACS) is partly compensated spent during combat services and trekking practice nomination for threatened axis radar picket ships (RLD), also covers aviation from the board TAVKR. A small amount of based aircraft on the ship now is insurmountable difficulty. And the spent practice of building area air defense aircraft carrier order (with 3 zones in range and 4 sectors and areas alerting ships and naval aviation group) allows excellent air counteract enemy even available means.

Now how «floating airfield» vulnerable in combat. Smallness «shapkozakidatelskie» notions of survivability of an aircraft carrier, lead to the opinion, that is a big goal is very vulnerable, and its just incapacitate. Here, but it should be noted that if the location of the aircraft carrier impossible to hide, it does not mean that it just hit.

Let’s start with the fact that anti-destruction means in the case of aircraft carrier group will be used at maximum range, so as to approach the aircraft carrier for a shot «point blank» no way for deck-based aircraft and other ships orders. A main function of carrier-based aircraft and carriers will struggle with RCC as surface and air, and underwater enemy. Range of carrier-based aircraft and acts are the «umbrella» covering the grouping from the exit of the enemy in the near zone and forces the use of a weapon at maximum range.

Here comes into play missile defense grouping. If the Yankees own missile carrier means are relatively weak, and the fight against anti-ship missiles (ASM) is assigned in the main to the massive anti-aircraft escort ships, then we are complemented his strong defense of the ship close action. TAVKR on «Admiral Kuznetsov» is set eight ZRPK «Dirk» (total 96 barrels caliber 30 mm., 64 ready-to-launch missiles 9M311 close act, ammo — 256 missiles), 6 AU AK-630M (36 more barrels), four PU SAM «Dagger» (192 missiles).

But what if the RCC yet started with the media, and some part of them broke through the missile defense of the warrant and an aircraft carrier? Let us not talk about preventing such a situation the principle of «acceptable losses» and the inevitable response by carrier-based aircraft carriers and ships grouping. Consider the worst-case scenario.

There will have to say about the structural protection of aircraft carriers, which, as the main target for the opposing forces must be combat survivability, based not only on defense. For example, in the case of U.S. aircraft carriers armor steel is used for the production of the flight deck and decks located below; bulkheads onboard constructive protection; the keel of the armored deck. More on aircraft carriers type «Forrestal», protection board consisted of five armored longitudinal bulkheads which are brought to the fourth deck and extending throughout the ship. The width of the side compartments constructive protection achieves 6-7 meters, and the total thickness of the side armor is 150 mm. Educated bulkheads compartments filled with fuel, water and special porous filler. According to American professionals incapacitate an aircraft carrier capable of hitting 7-12 Russian anti-ship missiles, and sink more than 20. Such protection applies to Russian projects TAVKR series 11434. Total weight of armor protection achieves 1700 tons, and the total thickness of the inclined board armor designs achieves 140 mm. With all this outer skin acts as the primary barrier, forcing work fuses flying up RCC. And for project 11435 («Admiral Kuznetsov») underwater and surface structural protection has been significantly improved and passed tests on full-scale compartments.

Vitality carrier can perfectly illustrate recognizable case. When in 1969, the aircraft carrier «Enterprise» after the spontaneous explosion of 127-mm ammunition detonated Nursi, who is on deck (just about 20 minutes left 18 massive explosions), including eight (!) 500-pound bombs, despite the strong damage and fire, the consequences were not tragic. Within a few hours, the fire was extinguished, and the ship was ready in principle to take on board the aircraft. The explosions took place on 14 January at seventy miles from Honolulu, March 5 and has an aircraft carrier after repairs in Pearl Harbor out to sea.

Also, one should not overestimate the ability of Western RCC, the bulk of whom are currently ASM «Harpoon». Then remember how in 1988 the Americans sank the Iranian frigate «Sabalan» Russian built, only a displacement of 1100 tons of fires caused by hitting the first 2-ASM «Harpoon», was extinguished after 7 minutes. Third hit just did not lead to fatal consequences. I had to finish the 500-kilogram bombs, and only after the third, he went to the bottom.

Now let’s see what has changed since the days of still introducing carriers in large-scale operations at sea of ​​the past century, and what role can be discharged in a promising Russian aircraft carrier fleet. Let’s start with the fact that the quantity and quality of global carrier forces will only increase. Development of carrier-based programs involved countries hitherto not possessed a strong fleet. South American fleet, bringing the total capacity of its own carrier forces to 2740 sorties per day, continues to increase their effectiveness. And taking into account that at least some script scale combat operations at sea will include South American fleet as of the 1st of the participants, one can firmly state that war at sea in the 21st century will be conducted with the use of carrier forces.

Ability of at least some of the fleet deprived of its own aircraft at sea, in a collision with the aircraft carrier, will abut against the above-described range of implementation tools, a limited range of acts of naval aviation. With all this naval aviation will not only «long arm» of its own means of destruction of carrier groups, but much of the total increment volley. Partly fill the unequal ability by other means can, perhaps, only we, as usual, we have a strong position on the air defenses, including marine. With all this, equipped only with a massive air defense aircraft carrier fleet in the confrontation, only be able to better fend off the enemy has the initiative. Read about the defeat of carrier groups in such a situation is difficult. Use as a counter AUG submarine forces also rests on its ability to considerable PLO. Then exit to the distance run is critically unsafe.

The situation changes if both of the opposing sides in the sea air. Fighter cover surface forces difficult to use them for aviation. Air cover areas of deployment of submarine forces allowing them to operate closer to the object of attack, eliminating the ASW aircraft. In the end, the actions of its antisubmarine aircraft generally impossible without air cover. Here comes the confrontation in a situation of uncertainty, which already excludes full advantage of one of the sides, leaving the possibility of victory on the capabilities and training of crew and military success. This is the parity situation, in most cases eliminates the possibility of conflict judgments uncertainty of the result or unacceptable losses. That is why the emergence of the Chinese Navy in just the 1st aircraft carrier so worried powerful U.S. carrier fleet.

There is another illusion on abilities Navy aircraft carriers lacking. This is purely guarding the coast, gives effect to shore-based aircraft. In the presence of a large foreshore length advantage will again be on the side of the aircraft carrier naval group. She will be able to strike the shore, without going into the near zone destroy coastal resources and the coastal fleet, while remaining under the protection of private aviation and submarine forces. «The right of the first move» can provide pre-emptive strike against airfields and will not give the ability to produce an effective ASW. A shore-based aircraft reaction time is significantly higher than that of a ship. Takeaway same defense zone further from shore using their own carrier forces, surprisingly, cheaper and more effective than the equivalent in ability to strengthen coastal defenses and coastal fleet.

In fact, these judgments led to Russian aircraft carriers, they’re forced to think about them at the moment.
Creator Alexander Gorbenko



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