The justification of mass disorders

The justification of mass confusion

When NATO forces have agreed to provide air support to the Libyan rebels in 2011, they quickly realized that only the United States has special planes need for round the clock air refueling, electronic warfare and reconnaissance. But the U.S. Air Force found that in spite of all the intelligence gathering info and analysis of data, similar to what is used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, was missing something fundamental. In short, target designators (spetsy elucidate which of the numerous possible targets are subject to impact, when and how) were without the experience of doing so like a large-scale bombing of Libya. In addition to non-long period in 2003 (during the invasion of Iraq), target designators are not faced with such a situation with the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the year. On September 11, 2001 designators not practiced a lot, because most of the bombing was carried out with a ground target designation providing support to ground troops. Despite the availability of affordable simulation training capabilities for planning target designators, in fact, these workouts were not in sufficient quantities. So makarom when approached by the turn of Libya, target designators air forces were bullied improvise. As a result, support for the Libyan rebels was not as efficient as it could be. Libyan rebels have not seen very much as the very air command of NATO forces. But that's not what he saw was not for the staff of the U.S. Air Force with experience of conflicts of 2003 and 1991's, and again, so they are preparing for a big operation like Libya or for the future of Syria, North Korea or Iran.

Education in the main is in a reasoned planning. This means these goals are in the theater of operations and the decision which of them to kill and when to do it in order to do the most harm to the enemy while minimizing the loss of a friendly hand. Even in the time The second World War was first used way of Operations Research (applying analytical methods to decision-making), in other words a combination of arithmetic and common sense. This method is used as before, but the true time computers do calculations and present the results in the form of a stylish computer graphics.

But there is one discrepancy discovered in Libya. It consists in the fact that it was hard to find whether there was in fact destroyed the goal or not. All the matter in the evaluation of the results of the bombing (Bomb Damage Assessment, BDA), the dilemma of the Air Force as a whole and the U.S. Air Force that is, with that they do not just cope. Evaluation of the results bombing is to determine the consequences of an attack on the enemy and conducted after the bombing by satellites, drones and spy planes.

The problem of misleading pilots land forces of the enemy proved to be during the second world war. That's when the Air Force was the first time used for the application of large-scale aerial bombardment. Immediately after that conflict, the United States conducted a thorough research on the effects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan. They found that the actual results were very different impacts on what to assess the results of the bombing during the war.

The Air Force promised to be a subsequent time more effective. But the experience of fighting in Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1965-1972), Kuwait (1991) and Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011) showed that the enemy on the ground continues own advantage and confuses the best efforts in evaluating the results of the bombing. The only proven technology capable to cope with the problem of evaluation of the results of the bombing are people on earth who are at close range inspect state attack during combat operations. In practice, this technique is difficult to implement.

There is even more basic discrepancy. Army and the Air Force have different sights on planning and risk. The Air Force view the war as a more neat and predictable than the occupation army. For this reason, the air force and navy are associated more closely. Both use technical means to implement more control over their forces more active than the army generals. The Army considers the war as a more unpredictable exercise and adapt to this unpredictability. Army generals are always skeptical about the requirements of the Air Force, and usually end up being right. But due to the fact that the equipment of the Air Force and the Navy is even more expensive, they get the lion's share of the military budget, and together with it, and the political impact.

Since the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. Air Force have remained silent about their own ability to do things without the help of others. This is because there is war and army makes a huge part of the job. Moreover, the case between the army and the air force have changed dramatically with the introduction of micro (up to 5 kg) UAVs and smart bombs guided by GPS. The Army employs thousands of micro-UAVs, giving each infantry commander his own air force, at least its its aerial reconnaissance. In addition there are smart bombs that were returned to the army belief in a particular air support. Now the troops are satisfied that the bombers are overhead beyond the reach of anti-aircraft artillery. Army across the bottom and fighting time From time to time just ask the pilots to push the button and throw smart bombs.

Conducted by GPS guided bombs have made a revolution in the conduct of military operations, but not in favor of the Air Force. Increase the reliability and accuracy of bombs guided by GPS means that it takes even less bombs and bombers. The Air Force so far has 69 years of advantages in the air about which they should worry about. Many officials in the Ministry of Defense fear that this advantage may be lost if the United States would not keep pace with the approaching transition to a robot fighter. Pilots serving in the Air Force and naval aviation are not lament about the adoption of robotic fighters to gain advantages in the air, but such parochialism has been a prerequisite for disasters in the past. Because of all of these changes and challenges for the Air Force, it is not surprisingly that about learning tseleukazatey actually forgotten.

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