Approximately day Russian army group in the region has been increased two times. Fast and good fortune of their response, the following actions were also a surprise not only for control of Georgia, and for the states of the West. Three days on a limited and very difficult due to natural conditions operational direction was created group of forces capable of producing effective actions and cause frisky not conceding defeat in the group numbers of troops of the Georgian army.
Bet that emerged in the course of the war, many shortcomings in the current state of the Army of the concept of development and improvement. First, we have to admit, the level of operational and technical equipment army was not prepared for such a conflict. During the first day or not there has been fighting an advantage Russian Air Force in the air, and in the absence of air controllers allowed the advancing troops of Georgia within 14 hours of shelling Tskhinvali. The reason was that the Russian Air Force operational teams were not able to allocate troops professionals without a parallel deployment of CP and RCP. In the air, there was no army aviation, tanks technique put forward in the conflict zone without air cover. Do not apply any air assault, helicopter or the methods of mobile units in the areas of mining waste Georgian forces.
Usually rather weak sides of the Russian army are fighting acts NIGHT MODE, communications, intelligence and logistical support. Although in this conflict, because of the helplessness of the enemy, these shortcomings have not played a significant role in the fighting. For example, the absence of the troops of the complex "Zoo-1", created for the exploration of the positions of artillery and rocket launchers, life is complicated by the Russian military. This complex is able to pinpoint the floating shells and missiles and to determine the point shot in a radius of 40 km. For the purpose of processing and delivery of data for firing Minutka takes less time. But these complexes in the right place and at the right time was not there. Adjustment of artillery fire carried out by radionavodke. Because inhibition of Georgian artillery was not enough effective, it is often changed their positions and fired pobatareyno not as separate tools.
58 army Squaw possessed mostly obsolete tanks (75% — T-62 and T-72). For example, the T-72B has a dynamic defense or "reactive armor" even the first generation. There was a certain amount of T-72BM, but set their complex "Kontakt-5" can not withstand hitting tandem shaped-charge munitions, which were in service of the Georgian Army. Night sights of our tanks, designed for 30 years ago, hopelessly out of date. In reality, the criteria they are "blinded" by bursts of shots, and the visibility is only a few hundred meters. Infrared illuminators are able to increase the range of targeting and guidance, but with all this very unmask tank. An old tanks did not have identification system "friend or foe", thermal imagers, and GPS.
In the columns of Russian troops were still the same BMP-1 "aluminum" armor tanks with a narrow, simple devices and surveillance sights. The same sad picture with armored personnel carriers. At times it was possible to meet the technique, equipped with additional armor or shields. So far, the motorized infantry, paratroopers, reconnaissance ride "on top of the armor", so safer. The machine is not protected by a land mine explosion or armor-piercing projectile, which would all burned from the inside. According to the Zar road trucks were leaving not so much lined as broken equipment. Under Dzhava part of advancing technology stood up, ran out of fuel, had to wait for him on the part of the transportation Rokkskogo tunnel.
The negative impact on the Russian army had experience of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus. There acquired techniques and skills were not effective against the fight with a mobile adversary, were marked by falling pieces in the "fire pockets" of the Georgian military. Also, our parts are often fired at each other, properly defining its position on the ground. 58 army servicemen after the conflict admitted that they often used the South American GPS, but after 2-days of fighting, the map of Georgia there was a "white spot". Adjustment of fire was carried out by optical devices developed in the 60-80s of the last century. Remote sensing surface using satellite reconnaissance was not used, as is often lacking receivers. During the battle was marked by bad organization of interaction between units.
Air Force is effective only to a limited degree. Maybe it was due to political constraints: for example, are not subjected to attacks from the air transport facilities, communications, industry, municipal government authorities of Georgia. Was noted in the Air Force trivial lack of modern precision weapons, first with the possibility of satellite-guided, missiles, "X-555" anti-radiation missiles to fight the "X-28" (range 90 km) and the "H-58" (range 120 km). The main shock weapons are commonplace aviation bombs and rockets. The structure of Russian group came only one set of mid-range UAV — "Bee". This "mechanical insect", weighing about 140 kg. and a radius of 60 km in the act. proved to be excellent even in the Chechen campaign. Unfortunately, at the moment due to the comparable small resource deployment, this technique at the physical layer is worn out.
This war has shown that the commander of the Air Force Association, who were subordinated to the army aviation regiments, in the absence of combined arms armies of the respective departments, could hardly be and plan the work of aviation — every day to put puzzles squadrons and regiments in the interests of motorized infantry units. It is unlikely that it can ever be, when the communication system will be overloaded applications from the "infantry". Maybe because Army aviation 58 army was not involved for the realization of tactical assault.
With all of this
must be highlighted that the management of aviation complicated by the fact that the air in the apparatus of armies and air force professionals on the application of Army aviation is not there. After the departure of qualified management departments and divisions of "experts" on the combat use of helicopter connections become managers of aviation and air defense. So it's not the fault of the people of the Air Force and Air Defense, and do not know the specificity of the Army that they were not prepared for the planning and implementation in practice of attached aviation, which manifested itself in the military operations of the army.
In the analysis of the army's actions in the conflict can be attributed to the shortcomings and the lack of unified command (in the U.S. is about 20 years) and relatively feeble GLONASS constellation and the associated non-use of controlled mines and shells such as "Daredevil", "Measuring", "Fringe" and the introduction of electronic warfare, to suppress air defenses Georgia. And the most important thing is the belated arrival of intelligence (gallakticheskoy-finding and intelligence, radio, electronic warfare), which time has not been able to inform the management of the country on the deployment and concentration of the Georgian army.