Rogozin: Dear colleagues, good day!
Let’s start the meeting of the special committee, approved by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in connection with the launch of an emergency rocket "Proton-M".
Let us build our work so: first hear the conclusions of the state commission, and then we will react to them with his hand.
The word I want to give Lopatin. Please, you have the floor.
A.Lopatin (Deputy Head of the Federal Space Agency): Dmitry O.!
Ladies and gentlemen,
Reporting on the results of investigation of the accident the carrier rocket "Proton-M" with the spacecraft "Glonass-M".
Launch rocket "Proton-M» № 53543 with the upper stage 11C-86103 and the block number 2A spacecraft "Glonass-M» № 47 (hereinafter — RKN) implemented on July 2 this year in 5:00 38 minutes 21 seconds 585 milliseconds maternity Moscow time from the launch complex 8P-882K (this launcher number 24, Baikonur). The handout, which is available for participants in today’s committee, please open a slide number 2. Completed crash of a space rocket by 33 seconds of flight. Structural failure and drop components RCN occurred outside the launch facility. No injuries or damage. At the crash crater measuring 40 by 25 meters and a depth of 5 m Fixed fire vegetation in an area of about 5 hectares and found the remains of local pollution propellant components (slide number 3).
Measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident booster and environmental monitoring at the accident site and in nearby settlements were Russian and Kazakh specialists (slide number 4).
Selected samples of air, soil and water in the territory of the cosmodrome in Baikonur city settlements (settlements Tjuratam and Akay) showed no excess of permissible limits of concentration of propellant components and products of its destruction. Work on the detoxification of pollution will continue to reduce the content of MCT to the level of its maximum allowable concentration.
In order to determine the reasons for the outcome of the emergency start-up and make necessary recommendations by joint decision of the Defense Ministry and the Russian Space Agency on July 2 an interdepartmental committee under my chairmanship. The committee included representatives of the Russian Federal Space Agency, the troops aerospace defense, head of research organizations in the rocket and space industry and the Russian Ministry of Defense. As part of the commission formed working groups on areas of operation (slide number 5).
Commission conducted a comprehensive analysis of the design, technological and operational documentation carrier rocket "Proton-M", studied in detail by telemetry, externally-trajectory information, photos and video obtained during start-up, the processes of manufacturing and testing of the carrier rocket "Proton-M "its component parts in enterprises GC" NPC them. Khrunichev ‘and enterprises — manufacturers of components booster. Analyzed the issues of transportation, storage, preparation of the launch vehicle at the technical and launch complexes, investigated the accident found the material part of the rocket-space purposes, a number of experiments and tests.
As a result of the commission established the following works. Rocket "Proton-M» № 53543 made on a government contract of 20 March 2010 between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Civil "SPC them. Khrunichev "on production data of launch vehicles under the federal target program" Global Positioning System ". Booster is made by the relevant specifications in accordance with the RK-98 is assembled, equipped and tested with positive results. In the manufacture of the booster admitted 19 departures from design and technological documentation, decorated with the appropriate permissions.
Preparation of the components of a space rocket (slide number 7) on the technical systems in a gas neutralization and petrol stations, launch complex was carried out in accordance with the operational documentation.
Observations took place in the preparation of component parts of a space rocket have been removed and closed in due course. Violations of process discipline and comments that could affect the regular flight of a space rocket in preparation have been identified. The quality of the components of rocket fuel complies with the requirements of technical standards and specifications.
Weather data in the launch complex at the time of launch rockets meet established requirements. The electromagnetic conditions at the starting area was normal. Electromagnetic compatibility space rocket launch site with radio-electronic means ensured.
Prelaunch pouting tanks of fuel and oxidant, the propulsion systems of the first, second and third stages of the launch vehicle, the transition to the power port passed normally, according to the start-up sequence diagram. The obtained data telemetry meet the requirements of the technical documentation and statistical average values of previous rocket launches.
Environmental conditions at the time the engine is started the first stage of the launch vehicle met the requirements of the documentation (slide number 8). Run the engine, the start of the propulsion system of the first stage of the launch vehicle took place in accordance with the standard operating cycle. Motors for the entire duration of stably operated in accordance with the cyclogram planted and parameters of the propulsion system were normal.
Until the fall of the space rocket propulsion system in the first stage functioned normally. Observed during the flight rocket plume jets bright brown color (it slide number 9 and 10) in the end products of combustion are the result of the regular functioning of the drainage system and reset generator gas with excess oxidizer tank pressurization system-oxidant.
Analysis of the full flow of telemetry data and comparative analysis of the results with the logic of the control system of the booster to the parameters of motion and control in the initial part of a missile carrier showed that the control system to function in accordance with the design documentation provided by the algorithms work. Signal processing touch-rise, KP occurred before the actual descent rocket launcher with support for about 0.4 seconds before the calculated time.
Because at the time of the signal CP all 6 engines of the first stage of the launch vehicle were at the intermediate stage traction control system before the actual separation of the carrier rocket launcher, full-time algorithm has been implemented spetsvvoda booster cable from the refueling tower. Approximately 6.8 seconds of the signal CP experienced a sharp increase in the values of the control actions to steering cars engines first, third, fourth and sixth and turning these steering gears to the maximum allowable angle.
Approximately 7.7 seconds of the signal CP angles steering gears via yaw reached the maximum possible values of — 7.5 degrees. (Slide number 11). Via yaw almost from the beginning of the flight has shown fluctuating divergent process. 12.7 seconds of contact signal rise recorded the formation of the characteristic exceeds a threshold angle, yaw disturbance via automatic stabilization were parried. As a result, for 12,733 seconds of the signal CP formed a team of "accident booster."
Analysis of telemetry information about the parameters of the movement and management of the carrier rocket, the algorithms of the control system booster in the initial phase of flight, flight plan data, the simulation re
sults before and after the launch of a missile carrier showed that the observed since the beginning of the missile carrier unstable, divergent process by Motion in channel Yaw associated with substandard performance of the three angular rate sensors for short — CRS PX-301 devices.
Analysis of the nature of the missile carrier in the initial part of the flight, the comparison of the signals from the gyro-stabilized platform and sensor velocity via the yaw and pitch have shown that the signal angular rate sensors for yaw channel has a sign opposite to the angular velocity of the carrier rocket on a given channel, the differences seen on slide number 12 and number 13 on the slide on the pitch no discrepancies.
Comparison of control signals for each steering engine, calculated in accordance with the standard algorithms of stabilization, with telemetered in-flight sensor-control system, with the opposite sign signal speed sensors and yaw via telemetered in-flight control signals showed that they coincide, thus confirming that the signal speed sensors for yaw channel has a sign opposite to the angular velocity of the launch vehicle, that is, does not correspond to the actual movement of a space rocket (slide number 14).
The results of the simulation using standard on-board software and flight mission with simulated premature signal CP and changed to the opposite sign of the signal angular rate sensors for yaw channel also confirmed the violation of the stability of the rocket carrier in the channel due to false readings yaw angular rate sensors management system booster, which is consistent with the data obtained during the flight of a space rocket.
The simulation results with simulated premature formation of the team KP and the normal polarity of the signal angular rate sensors via yaw confirmed normal flight launch vehicle program. This confirms that the premature formation of a signal CP is not the reason for the accident, as was the reason for the formation of full-time algorithm spetsvvoda booster cable from the refueling tower.
Slide number 15. In order to establish the causes of substandard performance angular rate sensors in the channel yaw Commission analyzed the technical documentation and manufacturing processes, installation and testing of PV-301 devices in enterprises — manufacturers of control systems and booster for possible deviations from the process or design documentation. At the same time, special attention was paid to the analysis of opportunities improper installation gyro unit in the sensor body angular velocity and angular rate sensors themselves on the carrier rocket.
Angular rate sensors are made at a branch of FSUE "SPC AP" production association "Case", Saratov. There was directed a group of professionals who audited the process documentation and process of manufacturing the device PV-301 (slide number 16, internal view of this), including the presence of the validity of the documentation, the status of jobs, their completeness, uniqueness of installation of the device on the process device for adjusting and testing, as well as the uniqueness of the gyro unit set into the housing, and others.
The analysis of manufacturing the device PV-301 in the branch of Federal State Unitary Enterprise "SPC AP" production association "Case", Saratov, excluded the possibility of incorrect installation gyro unit into the housing.
FSUE "SPC AP" in Moscow, the analysis of works on incoming inspection of these devices. The audit found that the level of organization of production technology ensure the implementation of input control devices in accordance with the requirements of design and technical standards. Deviations from the requirements documentation, affecting the quality and reliability of the angular rate sensors, have been identified. Installation of PV-301 (slide number 17) is made in the tail section of the second stage booster on the bracket in accordance with the process and the corresponding drawing.
At the time of manufacturing process was reconciliation. Bracket mounted on the technological process with a note in the passport. Technological operation defines how the six instruments on the PV-301 bracket in accordance with the drawings and is particularly responsible. Devices ED-301 are set to two groups of three pieces — three pitch, three — Yaw. Each side arm oriented in the same direction for each original group. Group of devices deployed in orientation relative to each other by 90 degrees. Alignment is defined as a labeled arrow on the top cover and indicating its measurement axis, and further defined by the location of the connectors. This can be seen on the slides № 18-22.
Technological process set points in turn blocks PV-301 for the seats on the drawing and does not regulate the control actions to determine the direction of installation of the device except for visual matching set in the drawing. Each unit is mounted on four studs M-6 screwed into the body of the bracket and placed symmetrically in the form of a rectangle on the landing plane.
For a more accurate setting, the device relative to the axes booster seat in the plane of the bracket — pressed two guide pins that define the required accuracy of the instrument setting and extending out of the plane landing on the order of 5 mm. The guide pins are offset by 5 mm relative to the axis of symmetry of the rectangle podkrepezhnyh studs and attempts to interfere in the case of improper installation of the device its normal landing on the bracket.
After the installation of the device prescribed normals fix it according to the drawing on the bracket, Rear wire and seal nuts in pairs according to the corresponding OST. After installing and fixing devices to regulate the process of metallization of devices according to the respective drawing on standard processes and subsequent validation of the transition resistance.
Commission noted that by attaching three TLS yaw channel in tail section of the second stage rocket extends in a complex assembly surrounding the inner surface of the instrument compartment in an extremely limited space. Access to the installation of devices on planes arm goes through two manhole manhole located half a meter from the installation area on both sides of the compartment.
The analysis process revealed its shortcomings. There is no visual information about the installation of the devices on the bracket. There is no control improper installation in case of a mismatch with the pin holes for the pin. There is no control switch to check the direction of the arrows printed on the upper surface of the body that determine the correct position of the device to the bracket. After installing the unit on the bracket before installing the cable and there is no control device position.
According to the analysis of technology instrument installation PX-301 on the bracket Commission suggested that there is a possibility of installation of devices with 180 degrees. To confirm this assumption, we conducted an experiment to incorrect installation with 180 degrees around a vertical axis and connecting devices PX-301 (slide number 23). On the bracket was set layout tool PV-301, turn 180 degrees around a vertical axis. Thus between the bracket and the housing unit formed from clogging misregistration pin hole and a pin mounted in a bracket. However, after tightening fasteners in accordance with the requirements of the process by visual inspection blockage was fixed firmly against the device to the surface of the bracket. When it is noted that the holding device metallization in the wrong position is difficult, but not impossible.
In order to verify the ability or inability to attach occurs cables to the block device (slide number 24) was carried out on board full-time cable to attach occurs nonstandard layouts installed device PV-301. Connect the device via two connectors coming ou
t of the common trunk cable, designed for all docking devices PX-301. In this case, attach occurs improperly installed device does not cause severe back resistance of the cable loom and cable cores.
Thus, the experiment confirmed the possibility of improper installation of the angular velocity sensor, instrumentation revolution by 180 degrees when set at their normal connecting the connectors.
With this in mind, at the crash site of a space rocket was organized by the commission find the material of the device PV-301. Devices are found, inspected, packaged, shipped to the manufacturer for the study (slide number 25).
As a result of the research committee found that on connecting surfaces of three of the six instruments (slide number 26) are characteristic traces of force action similar to the following that appeared after the experiment by abnormal installation of the devices.
Location impressions of force action on the relative position and size of the shift is almost completely coincided with the location of the device on the model that was used in the experiment.
The results of the experiment and analysis of the material confirmed the improper installation of three PX-301 devices on the carrier rocket "Proton-M» № 53543. On examination of the material, which is delivered to the launch site, the two improperly installed device is uniquely identified as the angular velocity sensor via yaw — the remaining balances on them from the red and yellow paint. The third has not been identified because the paint was burned.
The results of the work of the Commission has reached the following conclusions (slide number 27). The cause of the emergency start-up of a space rocket is incorrect installation of angular rate sensors for yaw-channel carrier rocket "Proton-M» № 53543 at FSUE "SSPC them. Khrunichev. "
The methods employed and the methods of control during ground training and testing under the current design, technological and operational documents do not reveal the improper installation of sensors on the launch vehicle.
Defect manifested itself in flight, has a production nature, apply to existing reserve carrier rockets "Proton-M". The Commission recommended that the NGO "Tekhnomash" develop a list of technical operations manufacturing products of rocket and space technology, requiring photo and video recording, and adjust the corresponding OCT. GC "NPC them. Khrunichev "together with the cooperation of enterprises, headaches Institute to develop a plan for re-examination of the existing backlog of carrier rockets" Proton-M ", the implementation of measures to be completed by the beginning of the preparation of carrier rockets" Proton-M "to the next launch.
The parent companies — developers, manufacturers of space-rocket technology to analyze the completeness and adequacy of the list of critical elements and particularly sensitive operations, including operations, taken from the control of military missions. Russian Defense Ministry has paid special attention to the elements of the space-rocket technology, requiring oriented setting, as well as excluding the possibility of controlling their proper functioning in ground conditions after installation. The results of the analysis of the lists and proposals for their adjustment to agree with the NGO "Tekhnomash."
The parent companies, developers, manufacturers of space-rocket technology on the results of the previous section to develop and agree with the head SRI action plans for additional inspection and testing of critical elements of the existing reserve space-rocket technology.
According to the results of the activities to make additional findings on the existing backlog of space engineering and submit to the Federal Space Agency and the Defense Ministry. GC "NPC them. Khrunichev "together with the NPC to change the design of the AP the enclosure PX-301 and the mounting bracket to the impossibility Incorrect installation PV-301 (180 degree turn) to conduct photo and video recording device installation PX-301 on the bracket, as well as an additional check of addresses and docking connector board cable network.
GC "NPC them. Khrunichev "together with a military representative to clarify the list and order of control especially critical operations of manufacturing and testing of space-rocket technology, manufactured now, taking into account the corrected list to develop measures for the control of products.
GC "NPC them. Khrunichev "jointly with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise TSENKI develop a list of process steps of launching space-rocket engineering at the processing facility, launch pad, refueling and fuel-pump station, demanding photo and video recording.
GC "NPC them. Khrunichev "together with the SPC AP to analyze and develop proposals to parry emergency situations, with the possible premature formation of the team KP.
FSUE TSENKI together with SC "SPC them. Khrunichev "to replace the docking mechanism elektropnevmorazema 8U-259 (build 03) launch complex 8P-882K (launcher number 24) on the new elements and components of the dismantled a mechanism to send to the manufacturer to determine the factors that can lead to premature processing of the KP .
The findings and recommendations of the interdepartmental commission to bring to the enterprise space industry to implement them.
That concludes my report.
Rogozin: Well, Alexander Petrovich.
The rest can be other things on the links.
Apparently the software engine has a limit on the size of the text. Not all climbed.
Selected quotes Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin
Since December 2010, it is the ninth in our accident. Most of the occurred when launching space vehicles for public use. Six accidents. The figures also make you think. Start-ups, which are carried out by order of state customers, as a rule, do not have property insurance. Maybe this factor too will have an impact on the organizations responsible for the results of starts.
We discussed this question last week, the Prime Minister. Once again I want to say, the decision is made. It can not be run without insurance. This is nonsense. This means that insurance should be paid by the customer, commercial or public, no matter what, enter the total cost of start-up.
Number of failed start-ups over the last 2.5 years strongly suggests that the causes of our failures are much deeper and more systemic in nature. This requires measures not only the organizational and technical nature, but structural changes of industry and federal agencies that are responsible for the implementation of space programs, as well as the entire system of their interaction.
A few conclusions that I said to myself. First of all, I must say that the senior management of the space industry are no experts who have experience in strategic planning and management of technically complex space rocket technology, including in the area of reliability.
Mild forms of scientific and technological advance. I will give you examples. You know how many in the United States, the number of scientific papers on the development of missile and space technology from 2007 to 2011. 716 works. In the European Union 658, we have 132. We, as a global space power, which launched the first satellite and the first cosmonaut. We touched on the fact will soon be exhausted. Branch pererazmerena and poorly managed. Salaries are low, they will be low, when we have a huge number of enterprises engaged in the same, in fact parallel and simultaneously working on the implementation of the same tasks.
Please, I’ll give you back the statistics, how much we have compani
es that are preparing our satellites — 10. In the United States — four in China — two. 10 Why, then? — And complain that the satellites have less resource than foreign. In this case, there is no single technical policy, both in the rocket and space industry, and virtually all businesses have — is subsistence farming, and to equip companies with modern equipment and applications, and mathematical software.