Popular on military logistics

Popular on military logisticsGood morning! Now I wanted to talk about military logistics. Not about the logistics of how science is being taught at the Academy of the General Staff, etc., and on the most philistine, the ordinary level. It is clear that the military, what I'm currently going to read — well aware. What we are discussing specifically about the campaign against illiteracy, in other words about the most ordinary philistine notions of war: what is and what is logistics staff work in the armed forces?

In ancient times, the need for the headquarters, in the headquarters of spices was not, in other words, military leaders could decide virtually all the tasks that stand before the army in the field of supply, in the transfer of power, and so on. When army asks only for their supply of food and fodder (and sometimes even feed was not required, since not all the armies of the horsemen was enough), and the army has only a few thousand people, is on the same road and razverstyvaetsya on the same field for the struggle — the huge logistical problems usually do not. There is a train, which carry with them, there is requisition food from the local population, in other words, forced abortion, and usually this is more or less enough.

Although even in ancient times experienced maneuvering, managed to cut the communications bleed, or even one hundred percent kill enemy army. In coming up with the growing number of troops, with an increase in the amount of supplies that are needed troops, logistics prepyadstviya seriously increased. And, virtually speaking, by the end of XIX — early XX century, they were so great that no specially organized severe service staff to conduct combat actions could no army.

Sami headquarters, as fixed structures, they have proliferated during the Napoleonic wars, in other words, when it is not just what-an officer, a dedicated commander, is engaged in the necessary work, and specifically there is such a thing as headquarters staff officers. What's all the same, actually speaking, the problem of providing logistics for military criteria. The first step is quite large scale, but not very difficult. Necessary when you plan to move troops or even when they are on the same site, to provide all the necessary supplies for each unit; when moving the unit to ensure its transport; calculate passage ways, calculated to move the units are not blocked the supply unit to other units, or their movement; provide all the necessary combat activities of this unit.

Again, the same was not the problem that is necessary to ensure, for example, food and supply a certain regiment, and that they must provide all at once. And this is done constantly, this is done without annoying. But when starting the harsh military actions, the picture changes dramatically and becomes more complicated. In what way? Imagine for yourself — there is a coming of the army. Let's say even comparable small — 200-300 thousand people — and that any division is moving forward. Must be calculated on what path it will move to the frontiers of what she will, to what boundaries to deliver supplies, as the division is lost, it consumes ammo, it consumes food.

As long as the front comes forward linearly (in general, the most common method coming) — the huge problems it causes. But what begins to be what-then maneuver, for example, a flanking maneuver against the flank enemies, the part of the troops starts making a maneuver that is called "going down the shoulder," in other words, the troops begin to turn at some center and farther from the center, in other words further promoted flank, the greater distances are troops.

Taking into account that the roads are usually not laid in this way, in other words, such Stealther community in every suitable place, respectively, is switching bandwidth supply from one road to another. There is a delivery of ammunition at different rates to different parts, but this is not counteract the enemy. Now we add resistance to the enemy. And behold, a division manages to break through further than necessary, faster. Some were able to slow down, spent some more ammo, some less. And almost immediately necessary "in the course of the play," in other words, in the course of the bout had to be moved to redistribute supplies, change the endpoints of routes that will be possible and closer, and then, and generally elsewhere.

Apart from this we have to immediately redeploy forces units, change the schedules of their movement. What for? There are no gaps in the front, in other words, that the enemy, taking advantage of these breaks, got no ability to destroy your army in parts, in order to troops interaction could lead together. That we have is still quite a leisurely, at the coming of the infantry movement, which is called "coverage wing", and which is developing quite well.

Task even more complicated when the enemy manages to take the initiative and start swinging your troops. In this case, the supply becomes even more difficult loss are unpredictable and need to stabilize the front by any stretch. With all of this does not matter what kind of transfer of forces along the front also leads to what has to jibe supplies, have retarget the main transport forces in order to ensure the troops are on the same direction and at the other.

In addition, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of maneuver reserves, the there is when the troops are coming, when they move beyond their rears when they provide a supply of the upcoming part, the roads are usually packed, filled, and if you want to throw in the fight reserves, then you need some method of clearing the way for them, in other words, too, to ensure their timely Coming. Incidentally, the logistical difficulties are most of the premise that as a trivial solutions (for "alternative service", or just for ordinary people who have read a book on the history) are unacceptable, such as: it was necessary to throw another 20-30 divisions here, and we here would have broken, would develop success, everything would be great. Most of these areas to throw these divisions 20-30 is simply unrealistic. Why? No supply lines, no ability to provide for their local resources.

The same goes for fans to talk about the permanent mobilization. Sort of, "We constantly increasing our troop levels." Let's say, some believe that the permanent mobilization could assist the Germans in the 41-42-year win the war. In general I do not like these devotees play war for the German victory, but in this case, what else is the problem? German Staff had planned to be quite a low level of loss, planning on the basis of experience of fighting in Western Europe. The losses were still huge — did not have enough strength.

But let's say, the Germans organize a permanent mobilization, in other words constantly forms the new and new parts and throw them on the front, and the loss were such as planned. What to do with excessive force, and that such excessive force? This means that the marching battalions are formed, are sent to the appropriate corps and division, and there is loss, which is not expected to incur. Appears unnecessary personnel. For it is not enough transport, it does not have enough food — it is there, simply put, is not needed, it can go on to form other parts. But he was exactly as completions (one estimated completion) specifically those parts for which these losses were planned, but the loss was not incurred.

That's why you should consider that all staffs working in the criteria predicting the events that occur, in other words to predict the loss
, expense and ammunition, etc.. They have all rushed to redraw when the forecasts are not realized. And that condemn the work of, say, a staff officer, reading about the events decades after them — not difficult. At least as we know by the rear, which were incurred loss, which operation failed to hold, and which failed. Hindbrain usually all strong. On this occasion, did not even have such a bad saying, "So I was always so clever as my mother-in-law then."

Themselves as staff officers are required to plan everything, not only in the criteria for when it is not clear what it will end and how will the operation, and in the absence of criteria for the comprehensive and detailed data about the forces of the enemy. About the enemy we know that? We know the line of contact with the forces of the enemy and the data that you provided us with intelligence. More about the enemy we do not know — we can only assume. We do not know what are the plans of the enemy, that he wants to do. Again, if their intelligence is not revealed. We do not know from what we provided intelligence, is the truth and what is disinformation. We do not know what specific forces of the enemy, in what direction — we can only assume and expect.

Accordingly, we can not find true: what will be the resistance to the enemy our troops on the particular section or, in other words with which to attack the enemy tempo, or how it will slow down our coming. Because almost always plans of operations, specifically in the staff implementing them, actually never work. There seems to be carefully painted with a plan: what, how, to what foreign troops are advancing, but the plan is working basis for further action. How to start the operation itself, opponent their opposition inevitably pushes the configuration to our operation and we have to constantly revise plans change along the way: power jibe immediately to other destinations; urgently offload some way in order to flip them on the troops and, say, supply in other ways; reallocate transportation resources and most importantly — is constantly confronted with the fact that, due to opposition from the enemy to us here and there is something missing.

With all of this activity is very Shtabnaya perfectly visible at the operational level and is visible at the strategic level, but it does not actually seen on the tactical level. Hence, by the way, and there was such a contemptuous attitude to staff officers and general staff officer to the part of the officers in the front-line troops that are specific to the band edge. Hence the notion of matter, such as "Shtabnaya rat." With all of this, as I have said, since the Napoleonic wars army without a general staff just did not battle-worthy. For all this, the more effective working staff, the higher the level of planning, much less complex maneuvers can produce an army.

Practically speaking, during the second world war, it was specifically due to the fact that the first of the war severe maneuvers iskhitryalas produce only the German army. Let's say, neither the French nor the British to the deepest spanned maneuvers were not able to. Well, actually speaking, our troops also had to be trained in the course of this war. In the upcoming these brilliant operations of our army of the war — against the Germans in the 44-45th year, brilliant coming in Manchuria — is to a large extent our reward is very great working staffs.

That's actually saying about the role of logistics staff at the level of literacy.

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