Why Kolchak reached the Volga?

Why Kolchak reached the Volga?

Snow-white movement has trouble at first on the war fronts civilian clothes. Scientists have so far can not give a definite answer to the question about the causes of the defeat of the armies of white, meanwhile, pretty to look at the relative strengths of the parties during the decisive operations plainclothes war, and they will become a natural fundamental and growing inequality, not allowing the crisp white count on success . In addition, more serious causes troubles of white were big flaws in military planning and fatal underestimation of the enemy. But the white continued to fight and had hoped to win, and if you need to impartially assess whether these hopes at least a reasonable degree: Could white in 1919 to defeat on the Eastern Front?

It would seem that the campaign of 1919 met the snow-white camp significantly consolidated. From the Reds was released and held a large area of Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. However, the white center of the country not controlled with greater population density and more developed industry, but preparing for the offensive, which was to decide the fate of Russian Russia. In the south, all the power was able to concentrate in his own hands, General Denikin, temporarily suppress separatism Cossack, in the east — Admiral Kolchak. In the summer of 1919 Denikin even announced his leadership Kolchak, but did so as early as the time when the Kolchak front cracked at the seams and white rolled away from the Volga to the Urals.

Why Kolchak reached the Volga?

Supreme Ruler of Kolchak and the British General Knox

Torrents coming Kolchak army began in March 1919 on the Western Front army, already white-March 13 was taken Ufa, and, according to some reports, the prisoner then almost got himself Leon Trotsky. At the front right-wing Siberian Army was taken on March 7 Okhansk, for the next day — the Wasp. Finally, on March 18, on the left flank of the Eastern Front began simultaneous advent parts of South Western Army and separate Orenburg army, which by the twentieth day of April, reached the approaches to Orenburg, but got bogged down in trying to take over the city. April 5th Army occupied West Sterlitamak, April 7 — Belebey April 10 — April 15 and Bugul'ma — Buguruslan. And West Siberian army inflicted heavy blows on the 2nd and 5th Armies Reds. In this situation, it was important, without losing contact with the enemy, to vigorously pursue him, to opening up the rivers to seize strategically necessary pt. But this is not possible. While the ultimate goal was the coming of the occupation of Moscow, the armies of the interaction of that plan was foiled when coming almost immediately, and the action plan of the Volga was not at all [1]. With all of this it was assumed that the main resistance will have a reddish in Simbirsk and Samara [2].

The left flank of the Siberian army braked coming to Sarapul, employment on April 10, April 7 was taken Votkinsk, 13th — Izhevsk, and then the troops marched to Vyatka and Kotlas. Meanwhile, on April 10 from the 1st, 4th, 5th, and the Turkestan Army was created by a group of South East Front of the Red Army under the command of Mikhail Frunze, who defected from April 28 to counter-attack, depriving Kolchak's chances of winning. On May 4, reddish took Buguruslan and Tchistopol, May 13 — Bugul'ma, May 17 — Belebey May 26 — Elabuga, June 2 — Sarapul 7th — Izhevsk. May 20, at the coming to Vyatka ran across the Siberian Army Group North, which finished on June 2 eyes, but this success was wearing only a personal nature and do not affect the position of the front and the first Western army began to retreat. June 9 white-left Ufa, June 11 — Votkinsk and 13th — the eye, as its retention is no longer made sense. Soon the snow-white lost virtually the entire area, which was overcome in the coming period, and fell back to the Urals, and then were obliged to retreat to the formidable criteria in Siberia and Turkestan, enduring terrible hardships, which doomed the folly of their own government. Important in the middle of the circumstances of the defeat became senior military task management and strategic planning. Do not forget that the origins of each solution was an officer of the General Staff, who had a personal theory and practical experience, their strong and lean features. More odious in a white camp in this context, it is the figure of the General Staff, Major-General Dmitry Antonovich Lebedev — Chief of Staff Betting Kolchak.

Many memoirs and researchers of the Lebedev main culprit trouble coming armies of Kolchak in Moscow in the spring of 1919. But in fact it is unlikely a single person, even the most mediocre, may be responsible for the failure of such a large-scale movement. It seems that Lebedev in the public consciousness was the "scapegoat" and was accused in the mistakes and misfortunes, for which responsibility was not. That there is a naivety and short-sightedness of other generals and Kolchak himself Supreme Ruler! Ataman Dutov, for example, in an atmosphere of euphoria from the success of the coming of the vernal told journalists that in August will have white in Moscow [3], but by the time they were driven back to Western Siberia … At one point in communicating with the general Inostrantsev Kolchak said: "You will soon make themselves, as we are poor people, and why do we have to endure, even on large posts, not excluding the posts of ministers, people far not occupied by their respective places, but — this is because there is no one to change them" [4] . Eastern front of white generally unlucky with the leaders. Compared with the south there was always a shortage of professional officers and graduates of the academies. According to the views of the general Schepikhin, "boggles the mind, like a surprise, how our long-suffering martyr soldier officer and soldier. Which only experience with it is not produced, which in its passive participation kunshtyukov did not throw our "strategic boys" — Kostya (sugars) and Mitya (Lebedev) — but patience is still overflowing "[5].

A truly professional and experienced commanders and staff officers in snow-white on the Eastern Front was not very much. More brightest names can be counted almost on the fingers of Generals V. Boldyrev, VO Kappel, S. Wojciechowski, MK Diterihs, SA Schepikhin, AN Pepeljaev, IG Akulinin V. Molchanov. Here, perhaps, the entire list of those who could rally attributed specifically to professional senior military leaders. But even these more moderate human resources used white-command is very rational. For example, the rise to power of Kolchak has deprived itself of white professional military control, as the former commander in chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Boldyrev. It specifically about Russian Commander II Vatsetis wrote in his memoirs: "With the emergence of the gene. Boldyrev on the horizon Siberia we had to be considered particularly "[6]. Diterihs solutions to military problems for a long time has been virtually removed and the first half of 1919 on behalf of Admiral Kolchak was investigating the murder of the royal family, which could not be fully trusted to a civilian bureaucrat. Kappel from January to early May 1919 and was not involved in combat operations, engaging formation of their own body in
the rear. Commanders of the three main armies of Kolchak were picked up very unsuccessfully. At the head of the Siberian army was raised 28-year-old adventurer mismanaged R. Hyde Austrian paramedic with the horizon, more than others by their actions contributed to the disruption of vernal coming. Western army led by General MV Hanzhin — the most experienced officer, but the gunner on a specialty, while the commander had to decide not narrowly technical issues gunnery. A separate army commander of the Orenburg Ataman AI Dutov was faster than a politician than a military leader, because a significant part of the time in the first half of 1919, he was chief of staff deputized AN vagina. On the other leadership positions in the Cossack units were put forward almost exclusively Cossacks by birth, from time to time in spite of Prof. suitability of the candidate. Admiral Kolchak himself was a naval man and a poor judge of military strategy and the strategy, so that in their own decisions was obliged to rely on his staff headed by Lebedev.

But no matter how talented or had generals without armies they can not do anything. And the armies of Kolchak was not. At least, in comparison with reddish. The laws of the art of war are indisputable and they say the need to at least triple advantages over the enemy for the successful conduct coming. Failure to comply with this condition and there is no provision for the development of the operation of success will only lead to loss of life in vain, and that came out in the spring and summer of 1919. By the beginning of the coming of the white had only The advantage of dual capable, and taking into account the non-combatant, and not just combat strength. Real value is likely to be the least of their more advantageous. By 15 April, sediment brunt Western army was only 2,686 officers and 36,863 bayonets, sabers 9242, 12 547 people in teams and 4337 artillery — only 63,039 officers and enlisted men. [7] In the Siberian Army by 23 June there were 56,649 infantry and 3980 cavalry, only 60,629 men. [8] In a separate Orenburg army by March 29 there were only 3185 infantry and 8443 drafts, only 11,628 men. [9] Last numbered in their own ranks almost 6 times less troops (including through the transfer of all the more valuable in the battle against non-Cossack units in the Western army) than neighbors command that allows for themselves more and periodic mockery of Orenburg. The number of separate Ural army exploration Reds in the summer was about 13,700 bayonets and sabers. All in all, the coming of springtime assumed the role of more than 135 thousand soldiers and officers of Kolchak's army (excluding the Urals, operating almost independently).

Why Kolchak reached the Volga?

Team armored train "Siberian" on vacation

When the Bolshevik administration has directed attention to the threat from the east, to the front were oriented reinforcements, equaling the balance of power by the beginning of May. Snow white is set to strengthen the harried parts was nothing, and coming rapidly ran out of steam. It is no accident Pepeljaev, who commanded in the coming period, the Northern Group of the Siberian Army, June 21, 1919 he wrote his own boss Hyde: "The rate has taken lightly off of 10's of thousands of people" [10]. Outrageous errors and disorganization in the management of the troops were are obvious even ordinary officers and soldiers and undermined their faith in the command. [11] This is not surprisingly, given that not even all corps headquarters was clear about the terms of the impending coming. In addition to an unprepared army command did not have obmyslennogo plan operations, and strategic planning itself was on the children's level. That there is a farce meeting army commanders and their chiefs of staff, Admiral Kolchak and February 11, 1919 in Chelyabinsk, when solved fundamentally a question of coming! Not attend the meeting Lebedev has long been accepted his own plan, which the admiral had to force to take all the commanders of the armies, the same had their own action plans and guide their tribute without coordination with its neighbors [12]. When at the front of the Western Army began woes, Hyde instead provide immediate support openly rejoiced trouble of its own neighbor to the left. [13] Very soon reddish transferred part of the liberated during the destruction of the army troops against Khanzhin Gajda, who repeated the sad fate ridiculed. Until now, the end is not clear is the question about the direction of the cerebral white-strike. In the spring of 1919, he could be applied to a 2-ways: 1) Kazan — heavy horse — Kotlas to link up with the troops of the Northern Front, General EK Miller and allies and 2) Samara (Saratov) — Tsarina to link up with the troops of Denikin. Significant concentration of power in the Western Army and online correspondence [14], and the simple logic of evidence in favor of cerebral stroke in the center of the front — along the strip Samara-Zlatoust steel road to a more promising direction of Ufa, which allows the shortest way to get connection with Denikin [15].

But to concentrate all the power in the Western army and coordinate coming from the adjacent army unions failed. [16] Mainstay Siberian Army was nearly as strong on his own composition, as well as Western, and its acts to a large extent have been associated specifically with the northern direction coming to Arkhangelsk. Committed to this path was the commander himself Gajda, who made no secret of their own views on this matter, even from civilians. [17] Snow-white generals recalled that of the Siberian army could always take one — two divisions [18], and sample instead Guides Support neighbor to the left, blows on Sarapul and Kazan, to operate without the help of others to the north was a serious strategic blunder, said at the results of the operation . This blunder opponent sent a note in his own unpublished memoirs and Russian commander Vatsetis [19]. Not yet the case on February 14, prior to the advent, Kolchak, Denikin wrote: "It is a pity that the main force of the Siberian troops, apparently oriented to the north. Combined operation of Saratov city would give big advantages: the release of the Ural and Orenburg regions, isolation, Astrakhan and Turkestan. And most importantly — the ability to direct, concrete connection of the East and the South, which would lead to the full integration of all the healthy forces of the Russian Federation and the State to work in an all-Russian scale "[20]. Snow-white strategists carefully painted the merits specifically the southern option, noting the significance of the creation of a common front against Denikin, the release of the Cossack regions and other areas with anti-Bolshevik-minded population (German colonists Volga farmers) capture grain areas and areas of coal and oil, and the Volga, which allows transportation of these resources [21]. Naturally, with all this inevitably stretched communication Kolchak that up connections with Denikin could lead to trouble, but the army came out in more developed areas with a dense railway network, also decreased the front and releases the reserves. In general, to coordinate with the south, it never came, as the coming of the 2-white-fronts developed in opposition. Great strides have already Denikin began after Kolchak's coming bogged down.

Vatsetis recalled: "The subject of the action for all counter-revolutionary front is Moscow, where they were rushed by different methods. Was a joint action plan of Kolchak, Denikin, Miller? Almost. We know that the draft general plan has been put forward Denikin and Kolchak, but it does not make neither the one nor the other, each acting in its own way ". [22] If we talk abou
t choosing between "northern" and "southern" variations, it is more close to the reality of the expression of the General Staff Lt. Gen. DV Filateva, and later served in the Headquarters of Kolchak: "There was another, the third option, not counting 2-KEY: move right and Vyatka, and Samara. It led to the eccentric movement of armies, actions and act locally to expose the front in the gap between the armies. Such a course of action would allow for the commander himself, confident in itself for themselves and for their own troops, and situating The advantage of forces, strategic reserve and extensively developed network of railways to move troops on the front and in depth. With all of this one of the areas selected as master, and the others — the essence of the demonstration to mislead the enemy. Neither of the 1st of the following criteria there in the Siberian army was not, except for the leader of confidence within yourself, because such an option had to be discarded without discussion, as leading inexorably to a complete failure. Meanwhile, he was elected specifically to crush the Bolsheviks, which led Siberian army eventually collapse. Position of the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919 was such that only magic could save them. It happened in the form of a decision in Siberia most absurd plan for action "[23]. Almost because of incorrect solutions Betting snowy coming, and already slightly cooked and not numerous, reincarnated as a blow splayed fingers. It did not work not only coordinate with Denikin, but even by the effective interaction between Kolchak's armies. More on this in the first days of the coming of the attention paid Betting Hanzhin who telegraphed on March 2 in Omsk: "Western army, inflicting a major blow, the right to expect not only a full relationship with her actions operations adjacent armies, and the full support of them, even sacrificing personal interests of these armies in favor of cerebral stroke … Siberian Army has made its own action plan and yesterday defected to implement it, not taking her to the designated start position — so far left flank of the army section of the railroad Sarapul — Krasnoufimsk to the demarcation band with a Western army is not occupied by the troops of the Siberian army, and the gap of the front cover and a half I have shelves of my body, Ufa, diverting these forces indefinitely from the body to accomplish the tasks. Orenburg army is in the same state of complete decomposition of Cossack units, as near Orenburg; expansion threatens to go on to give this army infantry … It is clear that such an army is not only fails to fulfill its mandated tasks Betting general guideline, it is not only not able [to] attack, but she had no strength to even hold front and suspend the spontaneous withdrawal and exposing the flank and rear shock army … "[24]

Chief of Staff Gen. Khanzhin Schepikhin wrote about Orenburg army that "substantially Dutov with its own pseudo-army — a bubble and left wing Western Army on weight" [25]. But much whether it was the best situation in most Western Army, where he served Schepikhin? In fact, this army, despite the contraction in its various completions experienced are common to all three of white armies difficulties. August 4, 1919 Assistant Chief of Staff at GHQ General Staff Lieutenant AP Budberg wrote in his diary: "Now our situation a lot worse than what it was a year or so back, because his army we've eliminated, and instead of against us last year and the Soviets vinaigrette of Red Army duds there comes a constant reddish army does not want — in spite of all the reports of our intelligence — to fall apart, on the contrary, it drives us to the east, and we have lost the power to resist and almost without a fight, roll and roll ". [26] The composition of Kolchak's forces left much to be desired a lot of the best. Catastrophic situation was not only with the supreme command staff and military talents. The middle and junior level was an acute shortage of officers. Personnel officers in general were rare. In 63000th Western army by mid-April, it was only 138 staff officers and 2,548 officers of the wartime [27]. According to some reports, by early 1919 shortage of officers Kolchak reached 10 thousand people. [28] Rear, on the contrary, was full of officers. Did not contribute to improve the situation and threatening attitude towards the former officers had previously served in the Reds and got in snow-white prisoner. 1917 laid out as a fighter and an officer. During the war in plainclothes officer corps began to show the inadequacy of the elders, spread a card game and other pleasures, drunkenness (perhaps due to frustration), and even looting. For example, in order to the Eastern Front number 85 on September 8, 1919 stated that the commander of the 6th Regiment of the Orenburg Cossack army sergeant AA Izbyshev "evasion of military operations and continual drunkenness" demoted to the ranks [29].

On the white East actually was not the 1st divisional, corps commander, army commander (eg, Hyde, Pepeljaev, Dutov), not to mention the Atamans that would be the criteria plainclothes war did not commit misconduct. Senior commanders served a bad example to others. The absolute value of the order was not. In fact, at least some-how or significant military chief in the new criteria was a typical leader. The interests of his own detachment, division, corps, army, troops were put up orders from above, which were performed only when necessary. Such a "chieftain" for their own subordinates and was the ruler and god. For him they were ready to go anywhere. As noted by the contemporary, "in the criteria plainclothes no war" sustainability piece ", and everything is based only on the" stability of individual leaders "[30]. Military discipline, as well as the interaction, such as missing. Quite a different discipline has been put at the Reds. Placing the blame for the revolution and the plainclothes war against the Bolsheviks, we must not forget the fact that the losing party is not in the least, and perhaps even primarily responsible for all the consequences. Complete disorganization of its own military command and impressive advances have led to the loss of the enemy in the ranks of white faith in victory. More brightly disappointment can be traced from the statements commanders. Comprised of army staff at the disposal of the Orenburg Cossack Army Maj. Gen. L. Domozhirov, speaking in the spring of 1919 at a gathering in the village stanitsa Kizilskoe, read about the pointlessness of the Cossacks fighting with reddish [31]. "I feel that I have undermined faith in the success of our holy work" [32], — said the first May, General RK Bangersky. II commander of the Orenburg Cossack Corps General Staff, Major General IG Akulinin army commander in the report of April 25, just wrote about the absence of a "particular case of heart on the part of the" native villagers "to the Cossack units" [33]. May 2, when the defeat of Kolchak was not the natural, commander Hanzhin imposed on a document of the resolution: "Our cavalry to follow the example of Red Army" [34].

Such recognition generals are expensive. Kolchak's army Macha wrong rassredotachivaniem capabilities on the front: she experienced an acute shortage of infantry units on the front of the Cossack (which, for example, has made feasible taking such a principled center as Orenburg, cavalry forces alone), and with all this drawback non-Cossack cavalry at the front . Only centralized management could lead to a victory of white, but the Cossack regions have remained autonomous, but the Cossack chieftains continued to pursue its political line. In addition to tactical and strategic problems it added, and psychological disturbances. The soldiers and Cossacks fighting in their own native lands, experienced a strong temptation as soon as the ability to go home or go to the opponent if the n
ative village or the village were at the front line (by the way, the Bolsheviks realized this, and tried to prevent this). After his release from the Reds and the Izhevsk plant Votkinsky home wanted even the famous izhevtsy and Votkinsk — one of a kind white part of the workers. During the heaviest fighting the end of April, when the fate of a snow-white case in the East, most of these "heroes" of the struggle against the Bolsheviks just went home (it must be said that the earlier "return to their families," he blithely promised myself Hanzhin). By May, the brigade remained in Izhevsk only 452 bayonets of the previous composition, replenishment arrivals were ill-trained and surrendered. [35] May 10 Haidee had to disband their homes fighters Votkinskaya division [36]. The Cossacks did not want to go beyond the boundaries of its territory, putting local interests above. As shown, the Cossacks could only allocate a portion of their own forces for a national struggle against the Reds, also provide their area as a base for snow-white movement. Before the creation of the mass of the Red Army Cossacks gave such a feature crisp white indisputable advantage over the enemy. But the lack of snow-white efficient repressive apparatus did not allow the leaders of snow-white movement is rapidly create a massive army (by terror) and eventually doomed them to defeat. Mobilized Kolchak forces were heterogeneous in their own composition. Almost all of the estimate Vatsetis: "I went out the front Kolchak quite heterogeneous, both in their own political orientation, and on the strip public group. Right flank — the army gen. Guides consisted mostly of Siberian democracy supporters Siberian autonomy. Center — Ufa front is composed of the kulak-capitalist parts and on the political bands kept the Great Russian Cossack-direction.

The left flank — the Orenburg Cossacks and the Ural region declared themselves constitutionalists. So it was at the front. What's all the same for the rear from the Urals to Lake Baikal, there were grouped remnants of the left wing of the former Czech-Russian military bloc: Czecho-troops and SRs, who opened the aggressive acts against the dictatorship of the Supreme Board of Admiral Kolchak "[37]. Obviously, with so heterogeneous composition of the morale of Kolchak's forces left much to be desired a lot of the best. Schepikhin, Pepeljaev and others have noted the indifference of the population to the revival of the Russian Federation, which has an effect on the morale of the troops. According to the views of Pepelyaeva, "It is a minute, when you do not know what will happen tomorrow, will not be part of a surrender completely. There must be a turning point, a new burst of patriotism, without which we would all perish "[38]. But the miracle did not happen. The morale of the troops depends on whether there are available reserves, allowing to replace parts on the front and give the men rest, and it depends on how the fighter dressed, shod, fed and provided with everything necessary. The problem of availability of reserves was one of the more painful for the snow-white. Almost coming Kolchak, Denikin, as well as, start and grow with virtually no reserves of some that could not lead to disaster. The calculations were based white-strategists, apparently, on the gradual compression ring around the Russian and the Russian Federation due to the reduction of their lane front. With all of this released new terrain on which it can be mobilized replenishment and releases native troops. But first you need to have at least to the line of the Volga and gain a foothold on it, which Kolchak to do so and failed. The operation began on the eve of the vernal mudslides, and very soon a few of the white-were a few weeks out of touch with their own rears (it came out in the West and in the Orenburg separate armies) are not well-established in the past, and now absent. Frunze rightly believed that the thaw will have to ally with the Reds. [39]

Indeed, as a result of river flooding could not move forward not only artillery and baggage, but even the infantry, which was first required to use the "matinee" (morning frost), and with the warming have been cases where riders and horses were buried together. Parts of buildings were disassembled due to river flooding, could act in a coordinated, lost connection between them. If reddish retreated to their base, where they could quickly recover, the forces of white, full steam rushing to the Volga to overtake a mudslide, at the critical moment were deprived of food, some clothes and ammunition, artillery, and of strongest way overworked. Such a situation, for example, was formed in April 1919 in the Western army. [40] General NT command requested a bitch about what he should do — keep on coming Busuluk and donate infantry or else wait out bad roads, pull wagons and artillery and troops to bring order [41]. According to the views of Sukina, "… go to the Volga feeble forces, weak, thinning parts — this is equivalent to the failure of the case" [42]. In reality, the deal fell through for a long time before the release of the Volga. Overtake the coming thaw failed and white bogged down. Stopping criteria in the same maneuver plainclothes war almost always a harbinger of retreat and defeat. "Stop — is the death of a civilian war" [43] — wrote General Schepikhin. Reddish, using a temporary respite, hiked reserves took the initiative in their hands, tossed reinforcements to the threatened areas and still allow white-reach anywhere decisive victory. Snow-white as well and have not received so much they need reserves. Specifically permitted to thaw reddish recover and apply the forces of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front counter-attack from the area Busuluk — Sorochinskaya — Mikhailovsky (Sharlyk). Ready to hit the Reds, although about it in advance and it became clear [44], there was nothing to fend off (a similar situation in the autumn of 1919 occurred and Denikin).

Snow-white could not even get to Buzuluk, who were instructed to take until April 26, and the metal catch Tashkent way to block communication with the Russian center of Orenburg. Because of the lack of clear intelligence it was not clear where to move a group of South Western army — his fist on the Orenburg either Busuluk or else keep it between these Fri [45]. In the end, he was elected the third, a failed option. Pepeljaev wrote about the Siberian army: "The shelves are melting and there is nothing to fill them … We have to mobilize the population of occupied areas, to act independently of any overall municipal plan, risking his job for the nickname" chieftanship. " We have to create a cadre of improvised, weakening of the military "[46]. Schepikhin noted that behind the Western Army had no reserves, "… further to the east up to the ball Roll Omsk though — neither of the 1st Regiment, and not much chance of getting anything in the coming months". [47] Meanwhile, the advent of the exhausted. In one of the best regiments of the 5th Army Corps Sterlitamaksky, Beloretsk to the left until the beginning of May, 200 bayonets. [48] In the regiments of the 6th Corps of the Urals to the middle of April, there were at 400-800 bayonets, of which half could not proceed because of the lack of boots, some wore sandals, odezhki not even for reinforcements. [49] The situation was even worse in the Ural Cossack regiments in which there were 200 people, was the elective principle and discipline is very weak [50]. May 2 Budberg already noted in his diary that advent white-choked, and the front reddish breached in a very unsafe place, "I think the situation is very worrying, and for me it is clear that troops exhausted and disheveled during the continuous coming of — flight to the Volga, lost their resilience and stubborn resistance (in general is very weak in the improvised troops) … Go Reds into action very unpleasant, because the able-bodied and ready reserves at Bet
s no …

Plan of action at Bets none; flew to the Volga, expected activities of Kazan, Samara and Tsaritsyn, and that will need to do in case of other prospects, did not think … I do not have the Reds — chased after them, had reddish — begin dismiss them as from tiresome flies exactly the same as brushed aside the Germans in 1914-1917 … The front of creepy, infinitely extended, the troops exhausted, no reserves, and the troops and their commanders tactically very poorly trained, can only fight and chase, unable to maneuver … merciless war conditions plainclothes make the troops vulnerable to outflanking and environment, for behind this meal and split destruction of the Reds animals. Reddish on the military side, too illiterate, and their plans are very naive and immediately visible … But they have plans, but we have no such … "[51] The transfer of the strategic reserve Bets — 1st Corps of the Volga Kappel — a Western army and its introduction in fighting in parts were serious miscalculation command. In a separate part of the Orenburg Army Corps Kappel could change the situation [52], but the army Dutova the decisive moment was provided bets to their own fate. With all of this body Kappel has been focused on the front raw, partly moved to the enemy (ie, the 10th Regiment moved Bugulminsky virtually at full strength, the cases of transitions have taken place in other regiments), and the remainder was used for plugging holes one at the front only Western army. According to the British Military Mission of the body reddish Kappel to run across some 10 thousand people [53], although this figure seems very high. Another reserve — Svodnokazachy body — is also a great role in the operation did not play. As part of the Siberian army as a reserve was formed with the February-March 1919 Consolidated Impact Siberian Corps. The case was put into action on May 27, to cover the resulting gap between the West and the Siberian armies, but almost two day or hostilities lost half of its own composition, first at the expense of surrendering prisoners, and in the subsequent battles did not show himself. Background of the housing woes at once obvious and incredible: the troops were targeted in the fight without proper training and putting together most of the regiment, battalion and company commanders received their destination only recently or during the extension housing to the front, and the chiefs of divisions — is even after the destruction of the body. The connection has been focused on advanced without telephones, field kitchens, trains and even absolutely armed [54]. Other large reserves in the army Gayda was not.

Why is it even such moderate replenishment of white did not provide all the necessary? The fact is that the real security issues have become the most narrow place Kolchak's military machine. Across Siberia took only the Trans-Siberian railway line, on the bandwidth capabilities of which almost everything depended the fate of Advent. I must say that the railroad in 1919, worked very poorly and supply different last irregularity. As a result, the troops had to carry everything you need with you, and in the latter case, the cross on self-supply, bordered by looting, embittered the local population and the corrupting forces. In particular, it was hard in those areas where the railroad was missing and needed to ensure the supply cartage. This was true of the whole left side of white.

Why Kolchak reached the Volga?

Kolchak during the retreat in October 1919

Note that famous for the film "Chapaev" "psychic" attack of snow-white without a single shot is not taken from a good life and not only in order to make the memory on the enemy. One of the major reasons was the absence of similar action in snowy ammunition, not much relate to psychology. General PA Belov Hanzhin wrote: "The basic premise of discouragement my pieces, from the views of the commanders, would be that they do not have long supplied with ammunition. There are now in parts of the thirty or forty rounds per rifle in my entire group of supplies to 10,000 "[55]. In March 1919 izhevtsam defending the city of Ufa was issued only two clips of cartridges [56]. Leaving the fall of 1918, the Volga region, snow-white lost their existing there munition factories and warehouses (Kazan — gunpowder and artillery warehouses, Simbirsk — two ammunition plants; Ivaschenkovo — Plant explosives plant capsule, artillery depots, supplies explosives to 2,000,000 shells, Samara — pipe mill, powder mill, workshops). [57] In the Urals, had military factory in Izhevsk and Chrysostom, but the weapons factories in Siberia was not quite. On arms of white cannon was the most different systems — Mosin rifle, Berdan, Arisaka, Gras, Waterloo, Maxim machine guns, Colt, Hotchkiss, Lewis [58]. Rifles foreign systems were immediately vserasprostraneny no less than Russian. A similar diversity identified the complexity of providing the army with proper ammunition. Thus, in the Western Russian army rifles were not, and to available to the Japanese did not have ammunition. [59] The situation was not better with machine guns and cannons. In the Western army by 15 April had 229 guns "maxim," 137 — "Lewis" 249 — "Colt" 52 — other systems, only 667. In the 44 batteries were 85 trehdyuymovok, two 42-line guns, eight — 48-line, seven — different systems and one Sticky bomb launcher. [60] In a separate Orenburg army lacked guns and machine guns.

In all armies felt the lack of communication, cars, armored vehicles. Because of a bad connection, for example, almost fell through coordinated advent of white buildings on the Orenburg first of May. As of May 28, the Orsk (Orenburg separate headquarters disband the army) from Ufa (the headquarters of the Western Army) could not pass up to 300 military telegrams [61]. Prerequisites were not only in the imperfection and mistakes techniques, and in frequent diversions when it is impossible to clean up the rear. Army did not have enough fuel. Pilots of the Western Army at the height of the coming of the vernal 1919 ordered "available [in] the squadron errant amount of gasoline … save for aerial work in crossing the Volga region" [62]. And that there is the appearance of an ordinary soldier Kolchak! Some of the small pictures depict a frightening picture. Even more frightening is that it is clear on the documents. In parts of the Northern Group of the Siberian army "people are barefoot and bare, strolling in Armyakov and sandals … Horse scouts, as the Scythians of the twentieth century, ride without a saddle," [63]. In the 5th Infantry Regiment Syzran South Western Army Group "shoes, most falling apart, were knee-deep in mud," [64]. In the 2nd Army Corps Ufa Western army uniforms without replenishment coming straight from the captains of the army and sent into battle. [65] Orenburg Cossacks instead of overcoats worn by the Chinese cotton jackets, of which many fighters in a warming povydergivali cotton [66], and the sudden advent of cold weather began to get cold and sick. "We had to build our own eyes to believe it, what was dressed armyThe best part … in ragged sheepskin coats from time to time dressed almost directly on the naked body, worn boots on his feet, which, when vernal mudslides and mud were just too much a burden … total lack of underwear "[67]. In May, arrived at the forefront Kolchak 'expressed desire to build part of the 6th Corps of the Ural … he was showing output to the rear portion 12 of the Ural Division. View them was terrible. Part no shoes in the upper part of the clothes on the naked body, most without their coats. Gone are excellent march past. The s
upreme ruler was terribly upset by the view … "[68].

This picture does not fit with the data on multi-million dollar supply Kolchak allies, including the 2-million pairs of shoes and the full regalia of 360 thousand people [69], not to mention the hundreds of thousands of shells, rifles, hundreds of millions of rounds of ammunition, machine guns tyschah. If all of this was delivered to Vladivostok, then to the front of it never came. Hunger, fatigue of incessant marching and fighting, lack of regular odezhki made fertile ground for Bolshevik agitation, but more often than it led to unrest among the troops, killing the officers to the enemy side. Mobilized farmers waged war without hunting, rapidly ran, passed to the enemy, taking with them a gun and opened fire on his fellow nedavneshnim. There have been cases of mass surrender. The most famous was a great rebellion in the 1st Ukrainian Taras Shevchenko kuren May 1-2, during which killed about 60 officers, and on the side of the Reds ran across the 3000 fighter armed with 11 machine guns and two guns. [70] Later in the direction of the enemy fled Sengileevsky 11th Regiment, 3rd Battalion of the 49th Regiment of Kazan and other parts [71]. Similar, but the smallest scale incidents have occurred in the Southern Group of the Western Army, the Siberian and Orenburg separate armies. In June 1919, a reddish, killing officers defected two battalions of the 21st Regiment of Chelyabinsk mountain riflemen, and at the end of the month near Perm surrendered without a fight Dobriansky 3rd and 4th Solikamskiy shelves [72]. In total, during the counter-offensive operations until the end of Ufa, reddish was captured about 25 500 people [73]. At not being able to command the troops simple conditions Kolchak coming up is not surprising. The chief of the 12th Infantry Division of the General Staff of the Ural Major General RK Bangersky reported to the commander of the body of a bitch May 2: "Logistics have ever had. Since Ufa (we are talking about taking the town on March 13. — AG), we do not get the bread and eat just anything. The division is currently unfit for combat. Need to give people at least two nights to take a nap and get over it, otherwise will be a great collapse "[74].

With all this Bangersky noted that not beheld in an old army such heroism, which was shown during the snowy Ufa and Sterlitamakskaya operations, but there are limits. "I would like to know so in the name of public higher judgments donated 12 Division?" [75] — Major-General inquired. But it was donated not only the division Bangerskogo, and the whole army of Kolchak. Orenburg Cossacks in the Western army had no fodder, horses were suffering from starvation, constant transitions and barely moved a step [76]. This sorry state of horse deprived of its fundamental advantages — speed and surprise. A white horse, according to the party's battles do not go to any comparison with reddish horses which were in excellent condition and as a result had the highest mobility. The commander of the 6th Army Corps Ural bitch May 3 Hanzhin wrote: "Incessant marches on incredibly challenging roads without dnevok and everyday battles last 2-weeks without rest, without carts, hunger, lack of clothing (lots of people almost bare … without coats) — that's the premise that all can kill young cadres divisions, people stagger from lethargy and from sleepless nights and battle their elasticity quite coerced. Please take the division in reserve to bring them in order "[77]. Specifically, General bitch, desperate the situation, did not hesitate to put before arriving in the city of Ufa soon after taking Kolchak barefoot guard of honor. [78] Bitch is in despair, wrote: "There is not even bread". [79]

Pepeljaev noted that "the war zone will drive down, rear endlessly rich, but traffic is such that it, in its actual state, you can not fight a war" [80]. According to the views of the general Bangerskogo, "taking Ufa made it possible to form a strong base, to fill the troops mobilized, will provide baggage and now the first May start coming of a large force, pulling the body … Kappel and forming more new troops" [81]. But it made no big deal … The crown condition of Kolchak's military machine was the rear, which is controlled by the white sand is very weak. Captain G. Dumbadze, aiming at the end of the accelerated rate of the General Staff Academy in Krasnoyarsk — one of the great centers of Siberia, recalled: "Having arrived in Krasnoyarsk, the first time I saw a fiery partisan flames that engulfed the whole province. Walking the streets of Krasnoyarsk was associated with a risk. Gangs Reds and individual Bolsheviks under the guise of government troops killed officers, using the cover of night. No one was sure who he stopped to check the documents: a real legitimate patrol or reddish masked terrorists. Light-warehouses and shops, pererezyvanie telephone wires and many other types of sabotage occurred almost every day. The light does not light up in homes or window curtain of dark matter, on the other hand grenade bounced into the light in the apartment. I remember when I had to walk through the streets NIGHT MODE, holding a loaded revolver in the pocket. All of this was almost snow-white heart of Siberia "[82]. All the Yenisei province and part of Irkutsk were enveloped the guerrilla movement, chained themselves to a significant force of white. In May 1919, the guerrillas systematically dismantled every day the way (from time to time on the significant distance), which led to a long disruption of train traffic on the Trans-Siberian (for example, on the night of May 8, as a result of sabotage railway communication was interrupted for two weeks) , burned bridges, fired the train, cut the telegraph wires, terrorizing railway workers. For every 10 days to the beginning of June had 11 crashes, east of Krasnoyarsk eventually accumulated more than 140 trains with ammunition and supplies, which could be quite superfluous to the front [83].

Dumbadze wrote: "There is no clear measurements for the determination of the terrible moral, political and material damage caused to us by partisans. I will always be in their world, what matters in the Yenisei province had a knife in the back of the Siberian army. Russian General Ogo … states that lost in the snowy Siberia without any strategic defeat of the Red Army from [84], and the cause of their death was a mess in the rear. Having experience in this armed rear, I could not agree more with what goes Ogo "[85]. Insurrections were shrouded counties Turgay and Akmola regions, Altai and Tomsk provinces. At this oppression used thousands of fighter, which under other circumstances would have been focused on the front. In addition, by itself the role of the 10-s of thousands of able-bodied men in the guerrilla movement clearly evidenced by the failure to mobilize Kolchak in Siberia. Add that because ataman front has not received reinforcements from the Far East, which, perhaps, could turn the tide. Analysis of the internal state of Kolchak's army clearly shows the utter impossibility of a successful implementation of the plans of snow-white command. Reddish, successfully launched a flywheel mass mobilization, had virtually unchanged The advantage of ways and means. During 1919, the average increase in the number kazhdomesyachny Red Army reached 183 thousand people [86], which exceeded the total number of troops available to the snow-white on the Eastern Front. By April 1, when the snow-white still pinned their hopes on the success in the Red Army there were already half a million soldiers and their number is constantly growing. The number of troops all the enemies of the Reds, taken together, do not go to any comparison with this figure. With all of this available to the mass of white before the creation of the Red Army as an advantage in personnel was quickly lost. The number of troops Reds, and in almost all cases, and their quality have gro
wn rapidly, the quality of white troops in relatively few numbers changed constantly dropped. In addition, the central position of the Reds allowed them not only to use an old army supplies and resources of an industrial center, and act on internal operational lines, destroying enemy one by one. Snow-white, on the contrary, acted separately, the sample coordinate their action proved too late. Because of the vastness of the theater of war, they were not able to use them in the available benefits, for example, the presence of cooked Cossack cavalry.

Affected and the error of some generals Kolchak, who made during the war plainclothes spectacular career, but did not manage to get the right experience. Resource mobilization white-controlled areas has not been fully applied, the tremendous weight of farmers joined the rebels in a white rear or simply evaded mobilization. Reserves was not prepared. The army had fitted a rear base and the military industry, the supply was irregular. The consequence was the constant shortage in the army guns and ammunition, communications and technology. Snow-white could not oppose anything and powerful Bolshevik propaganda in their own troops. Normal weight had a rather low level of political consciousness and was tired of long years of war. In the camp of Kolchak was no unity because of sharp internal conflicts, not only on political issues between the monarchists, the Cadets and the Social Revolutionaries. On the outskirts, controlled by white sand, acute was the state matter. Historically, there were complicated affairs of the Cossack and non-Cossack population of the Russian population, a Bashkir and Kazakh. Snow-white management conducted fairly Myagenko policies and measures are often terrible would not be implemented due to lack of orders of the device on the ground and monitoring their implementation. Despite the fierce reddish terror, persecution of the church, embittered farmers earthen policy, white and could not be a force that would bring order and was pretty for the masses. With the end of the First World War, the Bolsheviks lost the kind of traitors, which for them was fixed after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Snow-white, in contrast, have found themselves in the role of facilitators invaders. The leaders of the snow-white movement, in contrast to their opponents, not realized all the difficulties facing them tasks without the need to understand the most stringent measures to merit victory.

No matter how much we talk about snow white terror, saying that white leaders — people that are generated by an old regime — could not provide for themselves that the scale of violence that was needed in the years 1917-1922 for the successful implementation of their plans. Such representation was available to combat illegal hardened over the years the Bolsheviks. In general, their means of influence is not reduced to one only terror, constituting cruel, but for all that effective management system. The Bolshevik favorites were able to understand the principles of war in the new criteria, combining politics and war, as Clausewitz wrote back and it was not possible snow white. Specifically, the creation of the mass of the Red Army under the control of trained officers, an old army, controlled by the commissioners, and the nomination and pretty clear for most of the mottos of the Bolsheviks brought the victory. In snow-white had its good points, but excellent use of them they could not. In the end, reddish organization overcame a snow-white improvisation.


1. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 78.
2. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 84.
3. GA RF. F. R-952. Op. 3. D. 28. L. 2.
4. Ibid. F. R-5960. Op. 1. 8a. L. 89.
5. Ibid. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 3 vol.
6. State Military Archive. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 752.
7. Ibid. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 87. L. 11 vol. — 12.
8. Martial schedule armies of the Eastern Front. Of 1918-1919. Publ. AA Karevskogo and RG Gagkueva / / Snow-white movement in the East of. Snow White Guard. Historical Almanac. 2001. Number 5. S. 148.
9. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 68-69.
10. "Russia will be lost in the waves of modern anarchy." Publ. ND Egorova and NV Pulchenko / / Military History magazine. 1996. Number 6. S. 80.
11. See, for example: Petrov PP From the Volga to the Pacific Ocean in the ranks of white (1918-1922 gg.). Riga. 1930. S. 75-76.
12. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. LA 78's, Petrov PP Ordinance. Op. S. 76.
13. Budberg AP Diary / / Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin. 1924. S. 235.
14. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 10.
15. See also: Carpenters JF Chelyabinsk: development of a strategic plan for the coming of the Russian army A. Kolchak, the success of its implementation and the next failure (February-May 1919) / / Ural in the events of 1917-1921.: Burning problems of the study. Chelyabinsk. 1999. S. 79-83.
16. Volkov EV fate of General Kolchak. Pages of Life MV Khanzhin. Yekaterinburg. 1999. S. 128.
17. Gins GK Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak. M. 2007. S. 393.
18. Molchanov Fighting in the east of Russia and in Siberia / / East Front of Admiral Kolchak. Moscow, 2004. S. 423.
19. State Military Archive. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 746.
20. GA RF. F. R-6219. Op. 1. D. 47. L. 1 vol-2.
21. Boldyrev VG Directory. Kolchak. The interventionists. Memoirs (From "Six years" 1917-1922.). Ed. B. D. Wegman. Novonikolayevsk. 1925. C. 60; Budberg AP Diary / / Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin 1924. S. 241; Golovin, NN Russian counter-revolution. Ch 4. Prince. 8. An infinitesimal 1937. S. 114.
22. State Military Archive. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 820.
23. Filatev DV Tragedy snow-white movement in Siberia 1918-1922. Memories of. Paris. 1985. S. 53-54.
24. 24. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 31-31 vol.
25. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. LA 66's.
26. Budberg AP Diary / / Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 15. Berlin. 1924. S. 256-257.
27. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 87. L. 11-12 vol.
28. Eikhe GH Overturned rear. Moscow, 1966. S. 148.
29. State Military Archive. F. 39483. Op. 1. D. 57. L. 59.
30. Sulavko A. Studies on the strategy in the civilian war. Nikolsk Ussuri. 1921. S. 19.
31. Municipal Archives of the Orenburg region (GAOO). F. R-1912. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 30.
32. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 66.
33. Plainclothes war in the Orenburg region of 1917-1919. Documents and materials. Orenburg. 1958. S. 308.
34. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 53.
35. Carpenters JF plainclothes war in the Urals (1917-1922 gg.). Encyclopedia and bibliography. T. 1. Yekaterinburg. 2007. S. 149-150. In the upcoming situation with discipline and izhevtsev Votkinsk not getting any better — for more details see: Why did we lose white? Message from the officers and fighter izhevtsev and Votkinsk of unauthorized abandonment of their army ranks 1919 Publ. A. Ganin / / Snow-white affair. Moscow, 2005. S. 239-242.
36. Konstantinov SI Armed groups protivobolshevistskih governments of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia during the civilian war. Yekaterinburg. 1997. S. 165.
37. State Military Archive. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 817.
38. "Russia will be lost in the waves of modern anarchy." S. 82.
39. Sirotinsky SA Path Arseny. Moscow, 1959. S. 140.
40. For details, see: A. Ganin Montenegrin on Russian service: General Bakic. Moscow, 2004. S. 73-75.
41. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 109's.
42. Ibid. D. 27. L. 81.
43. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 98.
44. Petrov PP Ordinance. Op. S. 80-81.
45. State M
ilitary Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 126.
46. "Russia will be lost in the waves of modern anarchy." S. 81.
47. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. LA 71's.
48. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 68.
49. Ibid. L. 109's.
50. Ibid. L. 184.
51. Budberg AP Diary / / Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin. 1924. S. 228-229.
52. Eikhe GH Ufa adventure Kolchak. Moscow, 1960. S. 218.
53. Smele J. Civil war in Siberia: the anti-Bolshevik government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920. Cambridge. 1996. P. 320.
54. Simonov DG On the history of the Consolidated Striker Siberian Army Corps of Admiral Kolchak (1919) / / Siberia during the war, civilian clothes. Kemerovo. 2007. S. 55-57.
55. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 68.
56. Efimov [G.] Izhevtsy and Votkinsk / / East Front of Admiral Kolchak. Moscow, 2004. S. 436.
57. State Military Archive. F. 39617. Op. 1. D. 70. L. 156-158 vol.
58. See, for example: GAOO. F. R-1912. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 4-4 vol., Op. 2. D. 75. L. 8, 9 vol., 12.
59. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 188.
60. Ibid. D. 87. L. 11-12 vol.
61. Ibid. D. 186. L. 460.
62. Ibid. D. 11. L. 21.
63. "Russia will be lost in the waves of modern anarchy." S. 81.
64. On the oral memoirs of party fights AF Gergenredera — Letter IA Gergenredera creator of 13.01.2004.
65. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 53.
66. Ibid. F. 39606. Op. 1. D. 24. L. 25.
67. The snow-white sugar, KV Siberia (Internal War of 1918-1920.). Munich. 1923. S. 74.
68. Petrov PP Ordinance. Op. S. 88.
69. Spirin LM defeat of Kolchak's army. Moscow, 1957. S. 89-91. See also some good data on the supply of English: Pereira NGO White Siberia. The Politics of Civil War. London; Buffalo. 1996. P. 105.
70. Carpenters JF plainclothes war in the Urals … T. 2. Yekaterinburg. 2007. S. 144.
71. Shushpanov SG Forgotten Division / / A white army. Snow-white affair. Historical Popular Science Almanac (Ekaterinburg). 1997. Number 4. S. 44.
72. BB Filimonov A white army of Admiral Kolchak. Moscow, 1997. S. 39; Filatev DV Decree. Op. S. 79; Lobanov DA Perm Infantry Division Army Admiral Kolchak. Of 1918-1919. / / Snow-white movement in the East of. Snow White Guard. Almanac. 2001. Number 5. S. 91.
73. Kakurin NE, Vatsetis plainclothes War II. 1918-1921. St. Petersburg. 2002. S. 238.
74. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. LA 62's.
75. Ibid. LA 64's.
76. Vorotov MF 2 Orenburg Cossack Regiment in 1918-1920 (Notes Colonel Vorotovova) / / Hoover Institution Archives. Colonel Vorotovov Collection. Folder VW Russia V954. L. 17.
77. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 58-58 vol.
78. GA RF. F. R-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 62; Sakharov KV Ordinance. Op. S. 78. General Budberg wrote that the guard had no pants, but it seems the least possible — see Budberg AP Diary / / Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 15. Berlin. 1924. S. 341.
79. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 109's.
80. "Russia will be lost in the waves of modern anarchy." S. 82.
81. State Military Archive. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 65.
82. Dumbadze G. That contributed to our defeat in Siberia in the civilian war. Publ. AI Deryabina / / Snow White Guard. 1997. Number 1. P. 43.
83. Eikhe GH Overturned rear. S. 229, Novikov A. plainclothes war in Eastern Siberia. Moscow, 2005. S. 163.
84. We are talking about the book.: Ogo F. Blow to Kolchak in the spring of 1919, Moscow 1938.
85. Dumbadze G. Ordinance. Op. S. 45.
86. It is estimated by: Movchin N. Picking the Red Army in 1918-1921. / / Plainclothes War 1918-1921: In 3 vol. / Ed. Ed. Bubnov, SS Kamenev and RP Eideman. T. 2. The martial art of the Red Army. M. 1928. S. 87.

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