Why Our homeland is subject to the West? Tips to Vladimir Putin

Why Russia is subject to the West?  Tips to Vladimir PutinAs part of an ongoing project at the site of the "Central Eurasia" virtual panel discussion titled "Tips Vladimir Putin" was affected by a difficult set of issues around the interaction between Russia and the West. Discuss these questions answered a number of distinguished professionals from Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia: Valery Ivanov (Our Fatherland), Marat Shibutov (Kazakhstan), Alexei Dundich (Our Fatherland), Evgeniy Abdullaev (Uzbekistan), Igor Pilyaev (Ukraine), Andrey Kazantsev (Our homeland) And Murat Laumulin (Kazakhstan).

Vladimir Paramonov (Uzbekistan), the manager of the project "Central Eurasia": pochetaemye colleagues, it seems to me that at the level of strategy / strategies for our home the same positions with the West, keeping only the differences (or their visibility) on the least significant issues at the really tactical, and not strategic nature. In this regard, it appears that whatever decisions our homeland not take the place of the post-Soviet, Central Asia, Afghanistan and other regions, all of this does not change the essence of the total — the strategic policy of global subordination of Russian / Western development schemes / interactions. What do you think about this? Do you agree with this statement? With what is not you agree?

Valery Ivanov (Our Fatherland), valid municipal councilor of the third class in retirement believe that the Russian Federation is simply no other real, and most importantly harsh ability to influence the situation. Hence the attempts to save face with a bad "surrender." How many times was asked to "stake itself," namely in Afghanistan by the role in the economic recovery of this country. But where is there. There are some more global ideas and the loss of incommensurable.
Marat Shibutov (Kazakhstan), a representative of the Association of cross-border cooperation (Our Fatherland) in RK: I have long been talking about this, that the Russian Federation in the region for a couple of years playing as a junior partner of the U.S. and the countries of the region can not rely on the main issues in the conflict between them. Taking into account that the EU seems to have buried the "Nabucco" in its original form and will only get gas from Azerbaijan, competition on this front will be the smallest. Another thing — China. Completely may be that the U.S., which are currently growing presence in the Pacific will be concerned about China's increasing here in Central Asia. In the interests of both the U.S. and Russia, that there was a small but controlled destabilization of the region, which would be permitted to throw away the Chinese, and the countries of the region to return back under the influence of the Russian Federation and the United States.

Alexei Dundich (Our Fatherland), Department of Oriental Studies teacher (University): In my opinion, the former Soviet Union in the Russian Federation's own policies, and the western development schemes it is submitted. Another thing is that she has really coincides with the western strategic issues. This situation may change, for example, if the West will act contrary to Russian strategic interests. How, for example, they are inconsistent in Syria. For all this, a similar situation in Central Asia Our homeland will be more susceptible, as the region closer. For example, the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan meets Russian strategic interests of both and transit bases in Central Asia that supply the coalition. But the lowering of tension in Afghanistan and try to get an extra base, which is not fundamentally to ensure regional security, cause resistance to Russia.
Evgeniy Abdullaev (Uzbekistan), the researcher: my personal feeling — since the Gulf War (1991) Our homeland (then USSR), strategically embedded in the policies of the West, more precisely, USA. Another thing is that at times there were trials "play" that has been lost as a result of Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the collapse of détente (position in the post-Soviet space, the impact of the Middle East). The more successful of them were the ones that were somehow pragmatically connected with the export of hydrocarbons (there had to listen to economists and act prudently, that could benefit from) less successful — when our country has acted on purely military interests (in the case of Georgia). But the general "pro-Western" strategic vector in the external policy of the past quarter-century Moscow remained without changes.

Igor Pilyaev (Ukraine), Doctor of Political Sciences, Doctor: quite right. The strategic subordination of Russian external policy designed not development schemes in Russia is a permanent base, the essential feature of the Russian Federation since its emergence on the political map in 1991. Russian Federation represented by its bureaucracy and the oligarchs absolutely integrated into the new world order on the Rights of the raw material appendage nationless with decorative autonomy and clear for itself the status of a nuclear weapon — an unwitting gift defunct superpower. Regime of "managed democracy" in Russia to this day, in principle, acceptable to all the leading actors in world politics. In loss from that situation are, first, the Russian people, not having to actually own the state of the country and the Russian civilian society.
Andrey Kazantsev (Our Fatherland), Doctor of Political Science, Director of the Analytical Center (University): the theme of strategic limitations on the ability of one or another Russian foreign policy in the same Central Asia is a very principled. But then with the light hand of a number of not very well versed in matters of international relations creators left (Delyagin Kagarlitskiy) and neoevraziyskogo direction (Dugin, etc.) "nakrucheno" very many mythologies, from which you want to get rid of in order to carry out near- the reality of politics.

Yes, we are dependent on the world market, the western banking system, from the formal western (and, in fact, in most cases, a Russian, previously derived) investment. And it limits our foreign policy. And we are dependent on the global communications system and of Western popular culture. Get rid of these constraints is better because at least some government seeks to maximize their own power. But we must realize that we live in an interdependent world where complete freedom from restrictions is unrealistic. Rather, one should try to understand these limitations and very use to their utility.
Question that our homeland (for example, due to economic and other constraints of the global system) is very limited in his own abilities of an active foreign policy, including those in Central Asia, there was a natural. This is due to the fact that the policy RF after the collapse of the Soviet Union was very passive. Our home was not so much the subject as the subject of international relations, which was caused by the lack of sufficient economic and political resources of the Kremlin.

Namely, in Central Asia, this is manifested in full and deliberate loss of Moscow's influence all the tools in the first half of the 1990s. Our homeland deliberately minimized its presence in the region. In the brand-new millennium, due to the increased ability of the country (particularly in relation to the rise in oil prices and the establishment of the "vertical of power") appeared a lot of enthusiasm for a more active policy. Immediately began searching for a tool to increase the cou
ntry's subjectivity on the outside of the arena, in particular, and the efforts of professionals. But it is impossible not to recognize that activity and subjectivity can not be an end in itself. The strength of the country should be "smart." No wonder the world at the moment they say about smart power (smart power) in international relations.

"Cleverness" force should be, first, to adopt the realities of regional and international relations, and the system is to properly implement the interests of the Russian Federation in these criteria. No other criterion we simply will not, and fantasize (or bored) on the subject in a practical way is stupid. The problem is that, fight it — do not fight it, be indignant — not complaining, these realities will have to take into consideration. In this context, Moscow's policy in the region will always be limited, regardless of our wishes. But it must be obmyslit how to use the benefit of the Russian Federation, even these restrictions.
The reality of these follow.

1. The recognition of the existence of independent states of Central Asia and the rejection of the illusion ability recreating the USSR or something like that in at least some recent (albeit, for example, the Eurasian shell). The region is now very well (not in terms of the effectiveness of policies, but in terms of the ability to control itself) are kept under the control of local elites and / or counter-elite (eg, crime), and they are tightly woven, although some contend. If you do not understand the value of this one hundred percent of the local elites, it is unrealistic to effective cooperation with the Central Asian elites.
In addition, with all this disappears provided the main argument for the enemies of cooperation with Russia in Central Asia and their allies in the West. Restoration of the USSR or other forms of imperial economic integration method is unattainable, it can be done only by conquest. Because a number of neo-Eurasianists (first Dugin) that confuse the Eurasian economic integration with the re-creation of the Eurasian empire, make RF very bad service. They just get in fights Moscow with the local elites of new independent states also allow these elites to appeal to the support of the West, using the contrived danger of their independence (no wonder Dugin, one of the most quoted Russian makers of the West).

Therefore, one should carefully obmyslit ideology of Eurasian integration, without realizing it at the mercy of extremists. Specifically it, i.e. search for the latest, appropriate and pragmatic realities of the Eurasian ideology in the current time occupied by such famous Russian specialists such as, for example, AI Podberiozkin. Request is formulated to a certain pre-election article V. Putin, and even much earlier defined it in many publications bolshennom NA Nazarbayev.
2. Moscow in the first half of the 1990s. lost strategic control of the region in terms of refusing to him the other major global players. The local elite / counter-elites constantly "play" on the contradictions involved in the main region of majestic powers (Russia, USA, China, etc.). Even if the number of countries in Central Asia (especially those dependent on external assistance, countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) is embedded in the structure of the type of the CSTO, it does not mean getting Russia exclusive rights to the strategic region.

Immediately all the Central Asian countries are in interaction with the United States through NATO and through the SCO with China. Often, they use a rapprochement with Russia to produce new proposals from the United States and, on the contrary. Grows the importance of China, which is converted to a number value of 1 for the whole of Central Asia, gently "squeezing" Russian.
As can be seen, we need to understand how to prevent the Central Asian elites continue to play us, strengthening our confrontation with other stately powers where we do not need.
In particular, the "glory" strategy itself in the style of Bismarck's "Realpolitik" Tashkent, who likes to play the contradictions majestic powers in order to maximize its regional impact. We have often silly compete with the United States, where it would be profitable to work (for example, in the fight against extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking, the formation of failed countries, etc.). And in the future we may bump heads with the PRC, which generally catastrophic.

So, Moscow, at a minimum, limited strategic interests in Central Asia, the local elites and the interests of other parties involved in the region of majestic powers. Without taking these realities, we will work very hard in the region.
Murat Laumulin (Kazakhstan), chief researcher at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic research: the main focus in the relations of Russia with the West is European. Consider themselves as Western analysts, some issues that complicate the now Russian-European affairs, may be the least important or general abyss. Although a number of differences are likely to persist, and some worsen. Segodnyaschy concern in Europe about the undemocratic nature of the Russian Federation will just disappear, the protection of human rights and the need for the rule of law relevant to become puzzled (although debate over the merits of these differences remain purposes). Still not going anywhere harsh disputes concerning relations between Russia and the EU Member States (links Russia and NATO is also possible to prove a source of problems).
How to draw conclusions unanimously observers, things between Moscow and the European Union a couple of years are in a dead end. Our homeland only ensures that the EU finds a way out of debt and institutional crisis. In the last of the pre-election articles Vladimir Putin gave clearly realize that his sympathies are with the version of the anti-crisis reforms and institutional transformation, and defend Berlin and Paris (its implementation will help to consolidate the German-French dominance in a united Europe.) It is understood that such a transformation will specifically impact on the right of the Russian Federation and the EU affairs.

How to find spices, there are likely a variety of options. One of them is that the mechanism of decision-making in the EU quite rapidly lead to new economic realities, and the principle of "Europe of different speeds" in place on the institutional level. Stratification of the European Union on several levels of integration would contribute to the emergence of additional areas of cooperation that serve a "bridge" from the Euro Union (its main core) to the Eurasian Union. Implementation of differentiated multi-speed integration model has laid a basis for the new mega-project with the support points in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Kiev and Moscow. While, in general, such a scenario looks purely hypothetical.

Another option involves delaying the process of reformatting the EU, in which Berlin will have to make concessions to partners on minor issues. Perhaps one of the victims would be in the course of relations between Russia and the former Soviet states of space. Specifically in the East simulacrum of a unified European Union foreign policy has a chance to extend its life. Then the stagnation in relations between Moscow and is undergoing an internal transformation of the European Union will drag on for years. Europe will be unable to advance seriously open a discussion with Moscow on strategic partnership. In addition, activation of cheeky Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific region at some point will force the EU knitted look at the prospects of relations with the state naikrupneyshey Eurasia.
Third version of the Russian-EU relations may be associated with the rapidly deteriorating military and political situation in the Middle East, and with his long geopolitical and geo-economic consequences. They are associated with the prospect of redrawing of municipal boundaries in the Middl
e East, the flow of refugees, the struggle for the realization of Turkey's ambitions of regional hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean, South Caucasus and Central Asia, the danger of the revival of the Islamic Caliphate. So makarom understanding of common threats to Russia and Europe is one of the most massive stimulus convergence of these countries.

How to involve experts at Western in the future there will inevitably follow question: Should Our homeland to join the EU? Pluses include the opportunity for the Russians to travel freely, learn and work in the EU. Lows will be linked to the fact that the Russian Federation will not only allow European corporations the freedom of trade and investment on its territory, and to protect the rights, despite the objections of their Russian rivals and public opinion. Although the acquisition of European companies with high-quality management of poorly managed Russian companies, the substitution of a complete reorganization of management and responsible long-term interests of the country, it is, of course, will be very painful for some categories of Russian citizens (especially senior managers).
But even if our home will want to join the EU, it does not mean that the European Alliance agrees. The latent fear of the Moscow persists in some countries in Eastern Europe, because they will seek to block integration.
Thus, the EU might be expected from the Russian Federation, which seeks to join the EU, support for democratic change in Belarus; reduce its military presence in Kaliningrad and the withdrawal of troops from Transnistria efforts aimed at resolving the Transnistria region's difficulties and reunification with Moldova; facilitate the recognition of the independence of Serbia Kosovo and the normalization of relations between them, rejecting the idea of a special zone of Russian influence, including former western Russian republics (the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova).

Does not the fact that Our homeland If they want to accept the role of the EU, which, no doubt, will push the European Union. But it is quite obvious that the EU will not change existing regulations to carry out the wishes of Moscow. The rivalry between Moscow and Brussels more boils down to the question of whether our homeland secure its own strategic status of the main mining oligopoly power in the distribution network.
Vladimir Paramonov: I thank all the professionals who took part in this part of the discussion. Additions to the theses of the pochetaemyh colleagues, who pointed to the inevitability of some subordination to the West, I have a few and I will formulate them in the form of questions. As the same post-Soviet countries to build direct business with Russia as a strategic partner head / priority, recognizing the fact that the Russian Federation, in fact, already is a junior partner of the West, and the priority of the post-Soviet space for Moscow itself, at least, is secondary? How, then, to develop integration processes in the economic sphere for regional re-integration of the post-Soviet space, if our homeland immediately boosts the course of integration into the global economic space and Western universities?

Himself and answer these questions: building relationships in reality (and not declarative) strategic disposition and development of re-integration processes in such unrealistic criteria by definition. In my opinion, Russia should be myself and not try to be integrated into some external circuits and concepts of development. Exclusively as an independent center of power of the Russian Federation can count on rich economic development and play a role Eurasian integration power. And if the dependence on the West can not now be reduced Russia without the help of others, we should develop and use such schemes and methods of politicians who have allowed, at least, much to balance wind factor at the expense of, for example, such as the Chinese factor. Is it time to turn around, facing China?

And such criteria for the RF must be true important search for new thinking and breakthrough solutions that can only be only due to the development of public mental capacity, stable and large-scale organization of the system state analysis. Our homeland if it does not, then imposed the usual conclusion: does that mean the current political and economic elite of the Russian Federation to do it just do not / does not hunt and she resigned herself to advance subordinate role of their own country? But whether reconcile this role with that of the elite's control of Russia and our own homeland?

Note: The material has been prepared within the framework of a joint project with the online magazine "Time of the East" (Kyrgyzstan), http://www.easttime.ru/ with information support agency "Regnum" (Our Fatherland) and the Information and Analytical Center of Moscow State University (Our Fatherland )

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