So who shot down the U-2 Francis Powers?

So who shot down the U-2 Francis Powers?

No hesitation — reconnaissance aircraft struck 5th SAM Division 37th air defense missile brigade
Boris Samoilov
Published an article («MIC», № № 4 and 5 for the year 2012), in which on the basis of archival documents of the Ministry of Defence argued that the 5th Division 37th zrbr under Lieutenant Colonel II Novikov first missile struck the plane- U-2 spy United States May 1, 1960 near the town of Sverdlovsk, I thought that these facts is enough to close the crisp white spot in the country’s history. But, of course, wrong.

With great regret read an article museum director Yury Knutova Defense Forces («MIC», № № 17 and 18 for 2012), in which he in the worst traditions of some party-political workers brought upon my publication groundless and even insulting criticism has nothing to do having a business discussion.

I did not want to respond to this article. But since there are heresy and offensive speculation about my dishonesty and dishonesty officers 5th SAM battalion of the 37th air defense missile brigade, I decided to give the creator of the target response.

Conclusions based on guesswork

Yuri Knutov text continues in its own previous tendency of many journalists — no real, credible evidence to substantiate the method is very indicative and not clear on its content calculations that U-2 plane was shot down only 2 and 1st battalions of the 57th zrbr and 5 rocket — of antiaircraft missile battalion 37th zrbr «could not have a meeting with the goal.» This conclusion Yuri Knutov makes conjectures on the basis of the subjunctive and outputs using conflicting evidence from archival materials, which, of course, he is fully familiar.
What the initial data based creator in their own conclusions? These are:

fictitious adjusted cards 2 firings, 1st air defense missile battalions of the 57th and especially zrbr 5th zrdn 37th zrbr;
unreliable and inconsistent line motion flight spy plane U-2, as reflected in the archival documents;
Tipo clear lack of disk imaging, observed operators and guidance officer 5th zrdn 37th zrbr indicator displayed after issuing the command K-3;
abusive speculation about dishonesty and combat crew commander of the 5th Division SAM 37th zrbr forgery final documents of fire;
inability personnel 5th SAM battalion 37th zrbr «because of bad combat training» correctly assess and show the results of fire;
lack Tipo circumstances, in accordance with which the Air Defense Forces Chief of the Commission could adjust the final documents, which are supposed to be investigated by 3 are independent commissions;
and the other fabrications.
Now carefully. In his own memoirs («MIC», № № 4 and 5 in 2012), I immediately mentioned that all acts of combat crew members while shooting «pass on their stories, the records of telephone conversations with MP Brigade on Fri communications division (which I read personally) and speakerphone. » No entries while I, unfortunately, did not create. Naturally, I could not in 50 years to keep in mind certain digital data through the target moves with topographic bound them to the terrain, range rocket launch, range of meeting her goal, etc.

But remember exactly what or battalion commander or commander radio batteries (face combat crew 5th zrdn) and I’m including not filled and could not fill such false card shooting represented in the archive, in which states: «… meeting rocket with a view to not work because of the steep turn at the edge of target lesions with increased exchange rate parameter up to 24 km. «

Lieutenant Colonel II Novikov many times defended fact defeats the purpose of his division, said with all this, that there is no reversal goal did not commit, for which he received repeated reprimands from the command and control of the political division. Strikes enviable speed with which already May 1, 1960 Head SMP 4th OA defense Major General IA Shushkov issued and signed all the cards live firing (2, 1 and 4th air defense missile battalions of the 57th and zrbr especially 5th Battalion 37th zrbr). But the proceedings were still right up to May 6.

Yuri whips, referring to track spy plane U-2 of the archival documents, declares that the U-2 plane does not extend into the kill zone 5 and 6 anti-aircraft missile battalions 37th zrbr. In his article, I argued that it was not so much that it was corrected by someone track. According to records in the journal on Fri communication division (which I read myself) the commander of the 37th zrbr not once ordered Lieutenant Colonel I. Novikov open fire on the U-2, with the last time in a very rude manner, namely: «… (followed by coarse, neprelichnye expression) command to open fire or will set. «

Why brigade commander so nervously reacted to delay Lieutenant Colonel I. Novikov opening fire on the intruder, if, according to the Chief of the Air Defense Forces Commission and Yuri Knutova goal never came to the affected area of ​​the 5th Division SAM 37th zrbr ?

And another fact. In the 6th Division 37th zrbr also served as a graduate of the Kiev Higher Engineering School of Radio (SVPs VOP) Koshevets lieutenant, with whom we are after May 1, 1960 to discuss the actions of a day or. Thus, according to his statement, U-2 entered into the affected area of ​​the 6th SAM battalion officer guidance was ready to press «Start» button, when the transmitter CHP on one of the planes disconnected because the fuse blows in a circuit Blower magnetron.

With a crew hurt 6th zrdn watched the goal out of the target division, but failed to do anything. In the same article, Yuri Knutova U-2 plane generally passed the affected area 5 and 6 divisions, described an arc substantially east points standing firing positions both zrdn.

With all this Knutov fundamentally ignores statements of special services and intelligence agencies 4th OA defense (see document number number 4 and 7 from the archive MO in my article in the «military-industrial complex», № 5 in 2012), when they are independent investigation flight U -2 stated: «… the plane crossed the Soviet border at an altitude of 20,100 m, then left on the ceiling and practical, without committing any evolutions height and rate flew the chosen route. Any maneuvers on the route he did not make … was shot down in 8:00. 51 minutes. over art. Kosulino, according to the CID for adjustment 22,000 m. «

Again note that the Division of Major Voronov opened fire only in 8:00 52 minute.

In combat reports Commander 4th Air Defence OA number 0015 on May 5, 1960 does not mention the fact of occurrence of targets in the affected area of ​​the 6th Battalion 37th zrbr. While the commission’s report reflected Kuleshov casual «6th Division 37th zrbr fire on the target, due to a technical fault led CHP (open circuit in the engine ventilation transmitter).»

All these facts are evidence of inconsistencies and hide the real disk imaging on track aircraft and corrections officials to prove that U-2 plane did not go into the affected area 5 and 6 anti-aircraft missile battalions 37th zrbr and because they could not hit goal.

Yuri Knutov reproaches me also that I did not mention his own memoirs of catchy spots on the display screen cockpit «Y» at the moment of explosion of a missile, and does this on the basis of categorical conclusion: «Nothing like neither Colonel I. Novikov or guidance officer 5th zrdn at the moment was not observed. «

Where such a categorical statement Knutova, as if he was in the cockpit of the «u» at the start and during the missile’s guidance? The principle debate, adopted them, «I have not read it, but still I condemn you,» discourages the continuation of constructive discussion event May 1, 1960.

I repeat, 50 years could not accurately reproduce all the commands and reports of persons fighting crew in the cockpit of the «u» from the stories of the participants. But do remember that the first lieutenant reported Kramorenko is issued a K-3 that operators have been reports about the failure of automatic tracking and report battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel II Novikov Checkpoint team that, by all accounts, his rocket zrdn hit the target.

But Yuri Knutov only on his own assumption of the absence of «bright spots» on the display screen in the cockpit «Y» 5th zrdn makes concrete conclusions about the failure of the 5th rocket zrdn and categorically states that the Division of Major MR struck Voronov U-2 in the tail at a distance of 27 km.

With all of this for some reason he is silent on the report of the commander of the 57th zrbr Colonel SV Gayderova Commander Air Defense Forces. There is no mention of any of the «bright spots on the display screen» or commands issued on the K-3 in the 2nd and 1st divisions 57th zrbr. And states that Major MR Voronov and captain NI Shelud’ko «shooting results could not be found and may have been failures.»

Further. Yuri Knutov all calculations destruction founded on conflicting goals of initial data in the archival documents, including unsubstantiated ascribes to me almost co-author together with the Commission, Colonel-General Kuleshov shelling targets 5th air defense missile battalion at a distance of 50 km. Oh that’s really — with unhealthy on its head.

Of course, he was a bad read my article in which I have never called any distance run or hitting the target range, since I do not remember the data. It’s not me, and the commission of Colonel-General Kuleshov recorded in its own report: «… a 8.41 goal was fired 5th division one missile at maximum range (about 50 km).»

At the same time, Yuri whip in his article he gives an estimate of the reliability of this paragraph of the report: «As wrong (need to come up with such a definition. — BS) constructed phrases of the commission’s report, Colonel-General Kuleshov, it is likely that it has a not mean limiting destruction range missiles (about 50 km), and the maximum detection range (D — 55 km), taken from a live-fire rifle cards 5th zrdn 37th zrbr. Chance and obvious misprint when printed instead of 30 km of 50 kilometers. «

As I have stated above, none of the combat crew 5th SAM battalion did not sign the card shooting. Meanwhile Yuri Knutov indirectly confirms that the commission’s report are some commander, to put it mildly, incorrect and typos, and if read right — then correcting the data, which raises doubts about the reliability of the findings of the commission, as I argued in his article (» MIC », № № 4 and 5 in 2012).

Yuri Knutov ranges in my statement that the officers, sergeants and soldiers of the 5th Division in pure bright sky could see the cluster explosion of a missile at a distance of 60 km. In 1-x, who said that it was at a distance of 60 km? It is the fruit of the imagination of Yuri Knutova. In-2, and this undermining not only one rocket 5th Division, but also saps warheads still 3 or 4 missiles other divisions lower than the first, at the edge of the forest, beheld several officers and soldier start battery.

To put this fact into genuine swing — means indiscriminately incriminate me and many officers and fighter 5th zrdn 37th zrbr of heresy that does not honor Yuri Knutova.


And then even worse. Comes the turn of the subjunctive, abusive guesswork. So, Yuri Knutov writes that officers, sergeants and soldiers of the 5th Battalion 37th zrbr engaged in the main building, guard duty, and not in combat training. Because due to the large load Tipo economic affairs «inexperienced soldiers» could make incorrect decisions and show them in reporting.

Yuri Knutov also blames and officers of the 5th Division of dishonesty in preparing reports to the brigade headquarters after the shooting, allegedly they «had to improvise and give an indication on the tablet pave distant air situation likely (but not real) track targets.»

There is reason to believe that Yuri Knutov makes this conclusion by focusing on your own secured experience in similar situations. Giving absentia evaluation of strangers, not knowing anything about them, in my opinion, simply indecent.

Let it be clear to Yuri Knutova that all officers (except me) and sergeants before heading 5th zrdn 37th zrbr retrained on special courses on the study of S-75 and exams. First commission — Commander of Air Defense Forces, verifying May 2, 1960 the state of the art weaponry and battle our division after shooting intruders, gave the highest grade and quality of technical options station missile guidance. Commission members noted that they encountered in SMP 4th OA defense has only two so perfectly tuned CHP. Namely, the sensitivity of the receiving path CHP 5th zrdn was 112-114 decibels.

This was a reward technique cabin «P» Lieutenant Boris Selina and his subordinate — Sergeant N. Mosanu. Incidentally, after the failure of the offensive target tracking in the 6th Division 37th zrbr due to the failure of the blower fuse magnetron Mosanu I asked: «What would you do in such a situation?». Followed by instant response: «I’d stuck in terminals screwdriver magnetron in a few minutes without blowing would come out of order, but the combat task would be accomplished.» That’s taught own subordinates officers 5th Division (note in languid household criteria).

When performing live firing training center SMP implementation (in other words, at the site) in September 1960 5th zrdn got a decent score. On the way back our train was stopped in the town Kishtim, and the commander of the 37th zrbr ordered me, the moment acting commander radio battery (battery commander was sick), and configure the installed dock conscripts CHP-75 and two hours later step up battle duty. The personnel of the battery completed in time this order, and the next two months Division producing combat duty at this position. According to our intelligence, the United States planned to run again on the same route U-2 plane.

Yuri Knutov criticizing me and Sergei Selin based on obscure guesses at the same time ignores the basic archival document such as the report of Air Defense Forces Chief of the Soviet Defence Minister, made commander and headquarters 4th OA Defense May 2, 1960, in other words in the hot trail, not noticing, as if this document and was not quite.

But the Russian proverb says: «The word — not a sparrow flew out — you will not catch.» Commander of 4th Air Defence OA prepared this report on May 1 by his subordinates who participated in the analysis plane incident U-2. So do not trust them no reason.

Repeat an excerpt from the report: «As a result of the investigation found that the intruder was shot in 8.55 second and the first anti-aircraft missile battalions of the 57th air defense missile brigade (Sverdlovsk).

On the report of the commander of the army, at this time the aircraft was on the testimony of missile guidance station at an altitude of 21,000 meters above the on-screen indicators station missile guidance from shooting to create memories that the perpetrator at the time of the approach put missiles passive radar interference, and it is essentially the observed individual part of a downed aircraft already collapsing, and they reported that the plane apparently hit, but continues to move …

5th SAM Division 37th air defense missile brigade, despite the huge range, made one launch, but without result, because the target was outside the affected area SAM (all data entrusted to check carefully the commission in place and the results report) » .

It would seem, then what are simpler to understand painstakingly whose rocket damaged the U-2 plane to shooting 2 and 1st divisions. If 5th zrdn 37th zrbr missed, resulting in there «interference»? How long flight lasted downed plane? And what line movement? What results have been shooting at the 2 and the 1st division for finishing warped plane?

With interference Commission, as we we see, to understand, but in its own way. Interference «originated from explosions missile warheads division Voronov Shelud’ko» and not before. Yuri Knutov also unproven defends this position.

And the question is, whose is the rocket even earlier has lined plane, which began to crumble approach 2 missiles and 1st battalions of the 57th zrbr, but continued to move for some reason left the commission’s report and article Yuri Knutova quite ignored. But there was lots of disk imaging on line target motion undergoing a weird quirk. Of course, in order to prove 2 and defeat the purpose of the 1st battalions in pursuit and in the tail of the aircraft.

Maybe Yuri Knutov believes that this report commander 4th OA defense made incorrectly and there are, in his opinion, typos, as well as the commission’s report on the range rocket launch 5th Battalion 50 km?

I will not repeat all subsequent proceedings on archival materials, I think that they pretty much laid out in my article («MIC», № № 4 and 5 in 2012). All inconsistencies and contradictions in these materials justify the incorrect conclusion of the commission of Colonel-General Kuleshov that the 5th Division 37th zrbr «had a meeting with the goal.» The reasons for this conclusion I have already said in his article («MIC», № 5 for 2012).

In conclusion, I suggest as a disk imaging for thought all opponents, able to impartially evaluate information and draw appropriate conclusions from the document archive of Defense of the USSR (pp. 6, case number 36, Fund 72): «In the CPSU Central Committee. Reporting. May 1, 1960 at 5.36 foreign aircraft violated the airspace of the USSR in the space area 170 km southeast of Stalinobada and passed along the route … Stalinobad Chelyabinsk, Kyshtym, east of Sverdlovsk, Perm. In the district of Perm goal turned into recycle rate, entered the kill zone divisions 57th zrbr (Sverdlovsk), and they were fired. The purpose of anti-aircraft missile hit by fire forces 4-th separate air defense army. Bailed with flaming airplane pilot detained. Callsign downed pilot — MILF-25-524.

Marshal Russian Union R. Malinovsky.

Marshal S. Biriuzov Russian Union. «

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