The information revolution, according to industry professionals in the South American military construction, has had an impact on the formation of 3-node problems, which can not be considered when choosing ways of development of the armed forces and their adaptation to the requirements of the ensuing, in fact, new era in the history of the world’s population .
In 1-x, this is another «Migrations», now take the form of mass migrations. Consequence of this phenomenon — «reformatting» civilizational cultures. Misunderstandings and more than that neglect of this factor by the authorities in an environment fraught with the formation of non-adapted migrants significant, often well organized and even armed groups, open-minded militant that State.
In-2, an extensive worldwide distribution purely military and dual-use technologies, resulting in the official armed forces lose their monopoly on the means of oppression riots and neutralization «disgruntled by the regime.» Erased the differences in equipment rioters criminals and soldiers. Already made conditions for the emergence of weapons of mass destruction not only from rogue states, and from illegal anti-government groups. Terrorism in all its manifestations is becoming commonplace as a method of warfare with the military machine of the legitimate authorities.
B-3, functions and features of formal governments in the individual states take «imaginary» form, resulting in increased possibility of moving municipal control in the hands of «illegitimate» groups. Against this background, in the U.S., so called the society «pro-reform», a discussion on the follow ways to develop state of the armed forces and the circumstances motivating the autopsy, or impede its implementation.
Many of the tools — not a panacea
First questioned the idea that, allegedly, more than the defense budget, the stronger armed forces. If I had a smooth relationship between the «cost» of the country’s military machine and its ability to fulfill the role created for her, namely, according to the South American authority on military construction Winslow Wheeler, France and England had to beat Germany in 1940, and the U.S. ‘deal «Vietnam in the midst of the 60-ies of the last century and rapidly» pacify «Iraq and Afghanistan first 2000s. Such considerations have a direct relation to the armament and military equipment (AME). More striking example can serve as a Russian tank of times of the second world war the T-34, a much more constructive and a cheap regular, if expensive German «Panther» and «Tigers», which ultimately proved to be «a loser.» So Makar, looms chain findings: high price guns could mean its inefficiency — the complexity in manufacturing and management, also a small number of armed army; their small number of armed fraught uselessness implementation; highest personal characteristics (TTC) of the individual samples do not solve the problem of guns in general.
Eagerness to the place and out of place to call isolated cases of successful implementation of new models of IWT in conflicts of recent years, «the visible embodiment of the revolution in military affairs» obvious beforehand. Not once demonstrated in electric media episodes defeat South American precision instrument of Iraqi installations during the Gulf War in 1991 and even in 2003 were in fact very rare phenomenon. On average, according to statistics on the settlement of the 1st bridge could take up to several tons of weapons, and «smashing strikes» on the armor of the enemy from the air in general were few options.
Partly embedded in the South American Division and part in the 2003 war as a single system referred to as detectors, computers and communication devices, thanks to which the objectives of the enemy had opened on the far distances and be amazed with 100 percent probability, the reality did not live up of expectations. Large amounts of disk imaging simply «overloaded» commanders in the field, doing besides late. Intelligence on the deployment and operations of Iraqis transmitted «generals and colonels, seating in the headquarters in Qatar or Tampa (Florida), many commanders were simply ignored,» as only «zahlamlyayuschie messages from their own grassroots intelligence agencies.»
Noteworthy that, as noticed by «reformers», warned about similar things even more advanced specialists in the early 80-ies. For example, reference is made to the published in 1981 and received in the same period a wide resonance study Jeffrey Barlow, in which exactly stressed «inevitable failure in the future attempts to» control «the battle through all-encompassing network of communication from higher headquarters to the commanders of the grass-roots level, immersed in real and fast-changing situation on the battlefield. «
BOUND IN BALANCE «optimization» OF CONTROLS
In the early 90-ies of the last century there was a question about the «optimization» of government, which, as it later turned out, dared not the best way. So, consider some South American founders of «reforms», the main theme in the various types of reorganizations practice was to centralize the management of «one and all», in other words to provide more opportunities in the hands of the 1st person or authority. In reality, when all this was ignored or, at best, limited work devices that could bring real improvements. The system of checks and «balance of interests», particularly in terms of the positive influences the analysis coming from different instances and people suggestions and thoughts which is a manifestation of struggle and competition, leveled to such an extent that the decisions were made, based only on the outlook of the «elite», or in the best case on the results of one survey, but «close to the school authorities.» Not considering how to subjectivism and bureaucracy sprawl such practices to anything productive not led.
On the other hand, centralization in some cases was very useful. Thus, the «reformers» must agree with the fact that the Pentagon introduced in accordance with the «Law of the Goldwater-Nichols’ (1986) position bureaucrat solely responsible for the purchase of arms (» King of acquisitions «) contributed to streamline rassredotachivaniya contracts and receipts to the troops really the best examples of IWT.
Many managers are looking at their company as «something given from above and is not subject to any change,» zapamyatyvaya recognizable Jay Galbraith postulate that «the organization — it is a continuous, flexible process, during which solved task management.» As the currently larger and massive armed forces in the world, indicate the «reformers,» the U.S. military machine is an example of a very inflexible organizational structure, not enough adapted and even preventing the tasks that inevitably appear in busy changing environment.
Back in 2000, the commander of the Joint U.S. Central Command Gen. Anthony Zinni recognized «the inadequacy of its own headquarters exercising subordinate formations and units of tasks.» U.S. Marine Corps officer Eric Mellinger notes in this regard: «The modern headquarters is a vestige of the industrial age, symbolizing the rigid hierarchy, vertical subordination and accountability for their work.» Another analyst from Bell Labs Arno Pentz has been criticized for the fact that the existing management structure in the U.S. Armed Forces «crushes» for themselves professional and active officers, put them under the «control» and prevents the exchange of «life-giving information.» Hierarchical construction organization continues Pentz, should be such that at each level at least some of its member had the right to say «no.»
Way out of this impasse is seen in the introduction of a system of military control so called matrix-type scale structures those that are often created as a temporary (ad hoc) committees for solving some specific problems in civilian areas. U.S. Army Col. John Price, who has extensive experience in the service, including the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in this connection leads such example. During operations in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti devilish in January 2010, in which an active role perceived South American servicemen, commander of the United States Armed Forces Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis has formed a «matrix staff structure» for the operational management of all the actions of his subordinates. In this structure were included officers from different government Oyuk that together solve all, sometimes quite unexpected problems. But, to the disappointment of the admiral, as included in the operation of other organizations and agencies, both American and international, «weighted» by their clumsy internal relationships, was well-established work of staff has begun to fail. Stavridis to restore «traditional» relationships with these organizations and the interaction had to return to «normal» practice staff work that led to the growth of bureaucratic obstacles, and most importantly, significant delays in the execution of orders.
The proposed governance structure Tipo should simplify all staff procedures. Main with all this is that instead uzkofunktsionalnyh departments-departments focused entirely on the personnel, intelligence, logistics, «transformed» headquarters «solution» each of these functions in the main areas of execution of orders. To do this, artists professionals each with its own area of responsibility are organized into typical cell (team), capable to be independent, but the collective work in the process of solving puzzles one way or another. This approach, according to the views of John Pryce mentioned, will allow a period of «cuts» budget on defense and therefore inevitable reductions of personnel not only provide high efficiency staff work as a whole by the elimination of bureaucratic procedures and the associated duplication, and reduce the amount of generals and colonel positions required to manage departments and divisions.
Collated APPROACH TO REORGANIZATION
With all this at all, think «reformers» in dealing with matters related to the reorganization of military structures, whether headquarters or combat formations, checked against the need, many times in practice-proven approach. Winslow Wheeler to illustrate this thesis leads further example. In the 90s of the last century among the initiators of reforms the U.S. military machine was very popular study Colonel Douglas MacGregor «breakthrough phalanx: brand new structure of ground combat power of the XXI century». Created, namely, impressively substantiated that the main compound of the U.S. Army — Division — has been adapted for warfare with the Russian army on the Eurasian expanses, not for conflicts in different regions of the world in the post-war cool as a very «heavy» rendition for long distances and «clumsy» in the fast-flowing criteria battle with a very mobile enemy «new generation». McGregor views on such major NE formation could be more small-sized, more flexible formation of the brigade structure.
South American Landmarks reformyBuduschih military officers are taught not to fear the mud.
Noteworthy that the management of the U.S. Army, though «without enthusiasm» perceived this idea, but as it turns out, only formally. Connects major reorganization started in the so-called East brigade combat teams. This process, dubbed the «modernization of the army,» led to «shrink» the usual teams, in fact, denying or significantly reducing their composition means of providing all kinds. The number of teams has increased, but their combat power diminished. But the increase in the number of brigade headquarters, and as it should, and the number of colonel generals and even posts.
Significant problem that can not «lose sight» with the reorganization of the state’s military machine, indicate South American «pro-reform» is a problem of military training, and first officer, personnel. The «reformers» has been criticized for the fact that both the legislative and executive branches of government, declaring his concern for the armed forces, concentrating entirely on the real values, IWT, but often forgets about such fundamental issues alert components in general, as the selection for service in the Armed Forces of the best representatives of the people, their education and training. In other words, says Winslow Wheeler, «the emphasis is on» hardware «to the detriment of the people.»
Yes and military leaders, according to another analyst, veteran American military Colonel Robert Killebryu not care enough about the formation of a «new caste commanders», adapted to the conditions of the modern era. In his view, the current South American generals, brought up in the war years, cool and gets hardened in a confrontation with the harsh but «studied to basics» enemy, not very confident feels when he read «there is» new, are far not an obvious threat.
Indeed, during the period of war cool South American military system of training military personnel developing quite actively and also achieved certain heights. So, faced in 1991 in Iraq with the war machine, cooked on the patterns of the classical Russian school of martial arts, anti-Iraq coalition commander General Norman Schwarzkopf proudly noted that South American soldiers were so well learned that, put them on the seat of the Iraqi pilots or tank Russian standards in technology and, on the contrary, Iraqis — in the modern South American technique, this result would have been the same — the defeat of the Iraqi army.
By the way, the same way back in 1983 estimated the own pilots trained in South American techniques, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force, which is after the next war in the Middle East, said that even if the Syrian pilots to land in the F-15 and F-16, and Israeli — in Russian «MiGs» total dogfighting would be the same — 83:0.
Concerning the level of training of the teaching staff of the U.S. military educational institutions since the editor «Topgan Journal» James Stevenson gave an example, when instructors aviators flying the older F-5, usually always went favorites in training «battles» with students, manage the most modern at that time, F-14 and F-15. From these examples, the South American «reformers» have concluded that the right target and, most importantly, better prepared soldier more valuable for combat than special, mediocre even having the latest technology.
HIGHLIGHTS — BRAINS COMMANDER
Vandergiff Donald, who had created a stir in the 90 years of research «Road to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in the humanitarian sphere», recommended the creation of a more profound, fundamental education for military favorites, which should come to replace the current system of training officers Sun United States, which would be oriented on their mastery of subjects to be taught by «reflection and enhancing intellectual process» towards «knowledge features of military confrontation in the future, not the present day.» Views on Vandergriff, the armed forces needed not so much high-speed aircraft and tanks as rapidly commanders working brains, capable of instantaneous right decisions that will cyclopean advantage over the enemy on the battlefield.
In one of his own works, located in the midst of the 2000s, Vandergriff gives tips on how to create a thinking officer who could «think clearly in the criteria of combat stress and swiftly make the right decisions.» He says that South American commanders, educated and trained in the spirit of the second generation of wars (the first global war) almost always been an outsider in fights in the fields of contractions second world war with the Germans adapted to the requirements of the third generation of wars. Vandergriff urges South American generals closely examine the training of officers of the Prussian army of the XIX century, to fully embrace the principles of learning outlined more Swiss scientist Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, founder and now has not lost its relevance of educational theory and practice. With all this at the forefront should be put automatism brought to the practice of «careful consideration commander of each solution, if instant response to every change in the situation without thinking.»
And finally, another problem which, according to the views of the «reformers» can not be ignored in the orientation of military control by the U.S. military machine transformation of the country — so called prepyadstviya morality. These matters, which, as pointed out by «reformers», needs attention, even more than on military theory and practice, and even more so to supplying the armed forces of IWT. «In war — read Napoleon — morality factor relates to the physical as three to one!». Better trained and ottrenirovanny fighter always fails if has no desire to wage war: terror inevitably appears, and then — panic.
Issues of morality, or, in Russian terminology, moral and political factor, based on the beliefs of the American military science distributed from top to bottom, from the unit to the highest military and political control of the country, which «pro-reform» also pay little attention to. In their opinion, if the «fall» to the very grassroots level, to units of the armed forces, in other words before the separation (of the group), a platoon or company, then the question arises about the formation of «a cohesive team unit» or something like «podrazdelencheskoy hitch.» This involves the creation of a specific atmosphere in grassroots collective military, promote the development of such a bond of mutual trust and respect between them that allow transfer of combat stress maintaining cohesion criteria battlefield. Military personnel of the small, but formally organized groups, whether office or platoon, have no right to exercise a sense of «disgust» towards their colleagues on one reason or another, be it racial, class or other, and the «reluctance» to make the team, and even more so to show their timidity.
In this respect, curious expression 1st American professionals in the field of military psychology William Henderson: «Most soldier fighting a war not for the money and not because they are obliged to do it, and even more so not a god, his native home mom or they … fight to defeat defending their own companion in the adjacent trench. «
Vandergriff and his supporters believe that the system of military education in the XX century was based on the so-called industrial principles, where each individual is within the military command of the team was considered as a «cog in the mechanism», which is always with success can be replaced by another. Only in recent years, U.S. military leaders Tipo realized depravity such a case Cohesion military societies.
Basically, emphasizes mentioned expert Winslow Wheeler, understand, and the fact that the bonds rallying military teams should cover not only horizontally, and vertically, penetrating the entire military campaign from the bottom up. In another unit, in which there is no trust superiors, not be able to complete the commander of this puzzle. Likewise, if a superior commander does not trust subordinates, degrades unnecessary regulation of their conduct in the battle, eventually doomed to misfortune. Confidence indicator commander to his subordinates, Wheeler continues, can not become obvious normally adopted in practice for all razreglamentirovanny Fri order, more like a recipe from «Cookbook» and a kind of «order on the job» or «writ of intention.» In other words, the order type to take such a hillock or kill such and such a formation of enemy looks much more impressive on the basis of belief commander trust their subordinates, than, for example, in detail regulated document type advance on such and such a distance to such a mound, by a certain time, using means such-and-such in the nomination of an attack by spending in both cases, so many shells and rifle ammunition, and to report on the implementation in such a time!
What perhaps is crucial in the military action at least some scale — so it is a mutual trust and command troops, based first on the highest management authority of the country and the armed forces in the midst of the military. The «reformers» as negative examples, in other words, the virtual absence of such «moral link» between the military and political control of the country and military collectives Armed forces usually lead the Yankees defeated in Vietnam in the late 60’s — early 70-ies of the last century as a consequence of first «moral failure» in relationship to the band governance — the armed forces and a string of failures of the American war machine in Afghanistan and Iraq and the first mid-2000s due to the very low authority control the U.S. military, and its first head of Donald Rumsfeld among the «despised they mass troops, «the head of state also personally — President George W. Bush, who were not able to provide reliable» moral backup «led by their armed forces.
Perhaps limited. But in conclusion, it should be emphasized that the same South American «reformers» in the military sphere can not but mention the fact that the process of planning reforms in the armed forces of any state associated with hard predictable international environment and views, respectively, as «fit» under its conditions and requirements of the armed forces units of the future. In this regard, it is appropriate to quote the above-mentioned-thinking professional Robert Killebryu, which noted that, if in 1913 the U.S. military forecasters asked that of itself will represent the U.S. armed forces that way in 50 years, they would have said » According to the latest least three infantry divisions, one reinforced infantry regiment for the defense of the Panama Canal, and one — in the Philippines. Maybe even weaving aircraft. » Comments are superfluous!