Just as the Western world absorbed nedavneshnimi events in Crimea, on the periphery of the country the opportunity to behold the use broadens the chasm between Russia and the U.S. / EU to own their own purposes. Inside the Iranian regime has already begun discussions on how to dispose of this is best diplomatic spat for easing international pressure on the nuclear program from Iran and isolate the country.
On the one hand, the government of President Rouhani considers Crimean turmoil as a chance to break existed to this day the US-Russian agreement on sanctions against Tehran over its nuclear activities, but the orientation of policy towards Moscow for this camp is not the ultimate goal. Opponents of the number Rouhani irreconcilable, yet understand all very different. Camp hardliners in Tehran smells lingering Russian-American conflict, and some of its spokesmen already rely to prove the need for Tehran to prefer Russian policy of detente with Washington Rouhani.
Crimean crisis in reading Iran
The prospect of the latest cool war between the United States and Russia teases hopes of so many in Tehran. As the crisis began to unfold around the Crimea, a large number of Iranian politicians start loudly speculate regarding the broader implications of the newly heated battle for the impact in the world between Moscow and Washington.
This sense of excitement transcends sectarian boundaries among the Iranian political elite. And moderate camp led by President Hassan Rouhani and his opponents in a limited fraction in Tehran, agree that the crisis in US-Russian relations gives Iran the right opportunity; from now on Russia will have the smallest inclination to cooperate with Washington on the issue of Iran’s nuclear deterrent applets.
According to the prevailing view in Iran, the US-Russian agreement was an important factor to establish international consensus against Iran’s controversial nuclear applets. This awareness is reinforced by the fact that since July 2006, when Iran was imposed on the first round of international sanctions, South American, Russian widely supported measures aimed at Iran has toned down its nuclear goals. In the eyes of the creators of Iranian politics, the likely demise of the US-Russian agreement can only mean a weakening of international consensus that undermine Tehran’s position on the international diplomatic arena and its consequences, destroying its economy. After the unexpected start of the Crimean crisis Moscow has hinted that it will review its previous cooperation with Washington on Iran.
Although moderate and constructive factions agree that the consequences of the US-Russia row over Crimea likely will have a long impact on the world, they are obviously in assessing crawl like being able to open this for Iran. By moderate views, renewed conflict between Russia and the United States gives Tehran a very desired location for the diplomatic maneuver to undermine international consensus, which aims — to put pressure on Tehran before the time, until he can not dispel all doubts in their nuclear intentions. In other words, the Russian-American conflict is regarded as a jewel lever in the hands of Tehran as the government seeks to Rouhani methods remove the shackles of international isolation of Iran.
Ideologically limited to target camps in Tehran, with its innate suspicion and hostility to the United States, the crisis over Crimea — not just a means of reducing the isolation of Iran but potentially cool factor and the reorientation of Tehran’s foreign policy agenda. It is considered as a beautiful case in order to put an end to Tehran zeal Rouhani achieve détente with the United States. Instead, Iran at the dawn of modern cool war should join Moscow. Shortly before the annexation of the Crimea to Russia expressed in an editorial the newspaper conservatives «Khorasan», «days are coming time will assess current structures and decision-making about the ancient world order, which operated from the time of the second World War and the [last] cool war» ;.
Eye camp Rouhani
Since arriving in their own presidential palace Saad Abad in August 2013, Hassan Rouhani and his government undisputed value of their own policies made diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions Iran with the U.S. and other Western countries. As though to confirm what adekvatnomyslyaschy analyst, Rohani said that the continuation of acts of international sanctions imposed on Iran will be unbearable for his country and promised to remove the insulation from Iran. Rouhani foreign policy focus on the U.S. and the West has been associated with 2 highlights.
The first and certainly the most important event was the fact that Washington has been the main subject of the decisions that determined the extent and effect of harmful sanctions faced by Tehran. Because cancellation harmful sanctions constantly imply cooperation with Washington. As expressed by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfandzhani — himself a past president (1989-1997) and, one might say, close political ally Rouhani in Tehran — «America — major global power. If we can negotiate with the Europeans, Chinese and Russian, why we can not negotiate with the Yankees? «
The least significant factor was related to the fact that in general Rouhani and his government certainly in the West-its worldview. Gone are the days of the past of the former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who for eight years tenure as advertised idea of Iranian foreign policy as a focus on the South (Africa and Latin America) and East (East Asia) to instill an unconvincing view, according to which Iran can bypass the pressure from the West.
Rouhani promise about its own foreign policy of the campaign is to end the policy of aimless symbolic drawing Ahmadinejad in public and change its focus on narrow, but tangible task policy. Start the process of rapprochement with the West was the head of the list of values, but the broader goal of this new moderate Iranian government was a general review of the Iranian foreign policy. As indicated by the context, and even before the crisis broke out around the Crimea, the government Rouhani, soon after coming to power, has also begun to process and Moscow. The plan was not to give preference to the West of the Russian Federation, and to use Russian channel as a method to weaken the existing economic torment that suffered Tehran since bo? Most of the sanctions remained in force even after Tehran reached the nuclear deal with a group of «5 +1» in Geneva in November 2013.
Usefulness of the Russian Federation
Emphasis on government Rouhani economic cooperation in their approach to Moscow was obvious from the outset. Rouhani foundation laid during his own first meeting with President Vladimir Putin. On the sidelines of the SCO summit in September Bishkek Rouhani and Putin pointedly highlighted the usefulness of more closely economic cooperation. Less than 2 months, and soon after the November nuclear deal in 2013 in Geneva, Tehran and Moscow announced a deal «oil for food» $ 1.5 billion dollars per month, or about 500 thousand barrels of Iranian oil per day in exchange for Russian products, including grain.
Rouhani government did not hide its own desire to create a more certain guarantees from Moscow against the Iranian market. Last salting Iran in Moscow Mehdi Sanai told that in real time the two countries are negotiating a «huge number of economic issues, from energy to banking activities.»
Sanai boasted that a two-sided economic package could enter into force in August 2014. To promote this agenda in April in Tehran should pay a visit Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev. It was said that Putin himself, who visited Tehran in 2007, is planning a return visit to Iran, although this information is given to the Crimean crisis. Meanwhile, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation and Iran Sergei Lavrov and Javad Zarif visited the capital each other in December 2013 and January 2014 respectively.
But it is clear that it is not only in one channel providing the Ordinary for the implementation of Iranian oil through Russia and the implementation of other measures of breaking sanctions. Tehran announced that part of the Russian payments for Iranian oil can be carried out in the form of assistance in the construction of Iran’s new nuclear power stations. Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi said that Tehran is negotiating with Moscow to order the newest nuclear power plant of 4000 MW near the existing nuclear facility in Bushehr, where Russia in 2011 graduated from the first 1000-megawatt Iranian reactor.
Moscow has not once expressed a desire to play a leading role in the development plans of nuclear power Iran, which put before the official task to exit 2020 with capacity of 20 thousand megawatts. Russian, but have to be suspicious of the fact that the recent proposals of cooperation in economy and nuclear energy are more relevant to the government’s attempts to strengthen Rouhani newfound status of Iran’s nuclear background of the deepest vibrations in the West than a reflection of a permanent interest in the Russian Federation as a main commercial and trading partner.
This would be a good faith estimate by the Russian. Government Rouhani unrealistic fault that it looks at Russia through rose-colored glasses. Acts of the Russian Federation in the last decade have caused severe bitterness in Tehran. Besides its own multiple support sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council, Moscow’s decision to abandon in 2010 from the sale of the long-awaited anti-aircraft missile system S-300 in combination with tangible delaying the completion of the first unit at Bushehr strengthened classical Iranian doubt in. In Tehran, the prevailing understanding that Moscow was playing as Iran map for ensuring their own self-interest to the West, and that she did not hesitate to give up their own obligations to Iran, if required by the incident.
Russian playing card as a trump card in their own relations with the West is a matter for the government Rouhani applicable and justified. In fact, this particular course may try to choose the government Rouhani as manifestation in the coming months the effects of the US-Russian conflict over Crimea.
Not so long ago as close to the government said Rohani foreign expert Nasser Hadian in an article posted recently in Iranian Diplomacy, horn influential voices, mostly supporting foreign aaplet Rouhani, Iran must act as a «national government» in accordance with the external policy, which will serve him as their public interest.
In other words, instead of persecuting for ideologically corrupt and often illusory hopes that have become common in the era of Ahmadinejad’s government Rouhani must exploit differences between the U.S. and Russia, but try not to take sides in the Crimean decline. After Our homeland has never held towards Iran in its nuclear dispute with the West, and means nothing Tehran Moscow should not. Apparently, this point of view in the camp Rouhani is crucial.
At the same time, there is no hesitation that Iranian hardliners have stripes that of Russian annexation of the Crimea made completely different conclusions, including that it should mean for policy-makers in Tehran. Most extreme position was taken by the deputy chairman of the Committee on Public Safety and external policies of the Iranian parliament Hakikatpur Mansur, who said that Moscow’s actions in Crimea lay precedent for Iran to return its lost regions: «If we deal with that issue, we will be able to connect to 17 cities in Iran in the Caucasus, which were separated from Iran during the time of Qajar shahs ignorant [in the XIX century]. «
Hakikatpur and others like him in the political establishment tend to be animated, but they are far from normal assessment of the global implications of this latest US-Russian conflict. Now the debate in Tehran suggest the idea that the government Rouhani as before closely relates to the supportive role that could be played Our homeland as a means of pressure on Washington while pushing Moscow to reassess the usefulness of cooperation more closely, taking into account occurred in the past cases of disorder Iran’s seriousness Russian objectives in relation to for yourself.
When Iran’s national interests coincide with the Russian, as most clearly seen on the support provided since 2011 by both countries the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, we may expect that the government will closely Rouhani coordinate their actions with Moscow. But this is not tantamount to Moscow’s foreign policy reorientation in the broader sense — can be almost everything to disappointment constructive critics Rouhani in Tehran. Of course, that the president and his team Rouhani as before believe that lasting interests of Iran still require restoration of relations with the West, and that the crisis in the Crimea should not make the wrong lessons.