Congress approved a strategy to use nuclear weapons

Congress approved a strategy to use nuclear weapons
U.S. Secretary of Defense, acting on behalf of the President, Congress sent a «Report on the implementation strategy of nuclear weapons the United States.» After a number of days was taken by an official announcement about the main content of the guidelines the U.S. president on this strategy. Before this brand new strategy was approved by the Minister of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commander of the Joint Strategic Command (OSK). Last configuration in the implementation strategy of nuclear weapons (Piao) took place under President George W. Bush in 2002.

Brand new strategy came into force in August 2013th, and the next year (possibly before October 1) will be completed finalization and delivery implementing guidelines defense minister and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plans for multifunctional and geographic commander of the Joint Command, implementation plans USC commander of nuclear weapons the United States. This strategy is based on an analysis of the requirements for the implementation of nuclear deterrence and the need for a modern policy on nuclear planning for security, made by the Ministry of Defence with the management role of the JCS, USC, Department of Energy, the Department of Municipal and state intelligence apparatus and the State Security Council. ;

OBJECTIVES nuclear policy and nuclear weapons Purpose

The guidance of the President and the Minister of Defence in the report requires to focus only on those purposes and objectives that are needed for deterrence in the twenty-first century. Named 6 targets of U.S. nuclear policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and strategic stability at reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence and the proof obligations to their U.S. allies and partners; Save maintenance, benign and current nuclear arsenal; achieving the objectives of the United States and allies in the event of failure of deterrence.

Purpose of nuclear weapons (NW) defined in the report in the following form: «The fundamental role of nuclear weapons the United States remains the deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and partners.» Further explained that the country is not yet able to approve such a policy when deterrence of nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons the United States, and it is reported that the introduction of nuclear weapons will be considered in exceptional circumstances «for the defense of true fundamental U.S. interests or its allies and partners.» Immediately negotiated sophisticated compared to last century conditions nonuse of nuclear weapons: «The United States will not use nuclear weapon or threaten the introduction of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the Non-Proliferation Contract guns and observe its commitments on nuclear non-proliferation. » Judging by the «Nuclear Posture Review 2010» (NW-2010) Minister of Defence and his report on the strategy Piao 2013, U.S. nuclear forces produce strategic deterrence (without pent States) and maintain strategic stability (with respect to Russia and China) own nuclear triad, except that they still produce regional (extended) deterrence (having or seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon states) non-strategic nuclear weapon, already deployed in major areas and are in the U.S. readiness to deploy in developed areas, and the forces of the triad. In the U.S. open interpretation strategic deterrence — it first conviction at least some potential enemy that adverse consequences for him from his attack on the United States or its allies and partners significantly outweigh any potential benefit for him from the attack. In our awareness of strategic deterrence — is not a conglomeration of trousers, «conviction» can be graded and power (for example, «The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation» in 2010 officially includes the concept of «strategic deterrence» use of precision instruments). Under the strategic stability usually involve state nuclear equilibrium (nuclear stalemate), in other words the inability to cause at least some opponents with impunity first strike because of the presence in the country subjected to attack, guaranteed response capacity (second) shock.


The report lacks some criterion of the transition to the use of U.S. nuclear weapons on nuclear and non-nuclear states and non-governmental organizations. But they have nuclear weapons in 2010 the Minister of Defence: «In respect of countries that possess nuclear weapons, and countries that do not comply with their obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation remains a narrow range of emergencies, in which nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterrence attack using ordinary or chemical and biological weapons on the U.S. or its allies and partners. » As follows, if you tilt the slips of the tongue as a «narrow range of emergencies» and «extraordinary circumstances», the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is due to deterrence attacks on the U.S., its allies and partners previously uncharacterized countries that could use this as an everyday tool of and even what kind of weapon of mass destruction. Who are these countries? In the «strategic environment» Minister of Defense report on the strategy Piao not mention England, France, Israel and even India and Pakistan, but portrayed in «Al-Qaeda» and its allies, Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. Can be understood from the report that regional nuclear deterrence and commonplace tool oriented seeking nuclear weapon against «al-Qaeda» and its allies against nuclear weapons distributors — 2-states with unpredictable behavior — Iran and North Korea. And with respect to the PRC and the Russian Federation («Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects of a military confrontation between us drastically reduced», «threat of global nuclear war has become remote») U.S. support strategic stability.

Piao organization contains the definition of the order of target, options and types of strokes. Typically, there are two methods of targeting: counterforce and kontrtsennostnoy. Leafing JCS document from April 29, 1993, «Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations», where we find the following definition. «Counterforce targeting — a strategy for the introduction of forces to defeat or scrapping of the military forces of the enemy abilities.

Ordinary objects with counterforce targeting are airbase bombers SSBN bases, ICBM silos, missile defense facilities and air defense, command centers and warehouses of weapons of mass destruction. » «The strategy of targeting kontrtsennostnogo anticipates liquidation or neutralization of military and military related objects, such as branches of industry, resources and / or institutions that contribute to the possibility of the enemy to wage war.» In the near future a major target for counterforce targeting was often referred to as a weapon of mass destruction, and for targeting kontrtsennostnogo — «providing infrastructure war.» With all of this in the category of «weapons of mass destruction» (WMD) has become everything from production and storage facilities WMD and ending entities which decide on Piao.

Let’s go back to the report of the Minister, which stated its intention to «maintain a significant counterforce capability against potential enemies» and stated that the United States’ new guidelines do not rely on «kontrtsennostnuyu» strategy or a strategy of «minimum deterrence.» There’s also refers to the need «to apply the principles of distinction and proportionality, and to strive for the greatest reduction in collateral damage to a civilian population and civilian objects. The United States will not deliberately target the civilian population and civilian objects. » So, Americans do not rely on a strategy of «minimum deterrence», providing a limited number of state possession of nuclear warheads (YABZ) to engage only cities, and do not rely on «kontrtsennostnuyu» strategy. (But of course, that «does not rely» does not mean a hundred percent abandon kontrtsennostnogo targeting). As follows counterforce targeting will act in several «narrowed» form, but kontrtsennostnoe — in apparently curtailed. Immediately one wonders whether a position is not related that the Americans do not rely on kontrtsennostnuyu strategy with the possibility of reducing their countable strategic YABZ one third part, in other words, somewhere in the 500 YABZ?

WILL BLOW proactive and unexpected

In developing plans for Piao matter which party should anticipate four variants of nuclear strikes: unexpected (preventive), pre-emptive, retaliatory (detection launch missiles) and back (after nuclear explosions on its territory). If YAO 2010 expressly refers to the existence of plans for retaliation («strategic stability to ensure a second strike»), the 2013 report is concerned only with version retaliatory strike.

Guidelines require the President of the Defence Ministry, «examine and reduce the role of retaliatory strike in planning for an emergency, knowing that the possibility of unexpected disarming nuclear attack is very remote. Retaining the ability of the United States to carry out retaliatory strike, the Defense Department should focus on planning a possible twenty-first century in an emergency. » The text of the wording of this thesis in the report differs from the above one slip of the tongue: «The Ministry of Defence to explore additional options to reduce the role of the retaliatory strike, which he played in planning the U.S., while maintaining the possibility to put retaliatory strike if it is an order.» ;

Try to think about the background of this requirement and its consequences guess. To assess the situation, the choice and decision on retaliatory strike U.S. president has a maximum 10-12 minute, that obviously is not enough. Combat crews Fri U.S. ICBM launch control are in constant readiness to launch on the orders of the president (as they say, «keep your finger on the trigger»), regardless of whether there is booming on the planet or else the world over the United States gathering clouds. In the criteria of strategic stability the United States expect thunder from a clear sky (sudden attack by Russia and China) is not necessary, because the maintenance of alert forces on existing ICBMs Summit readiness irrationally.

Way out of the situation, and adaptation to the reality of our time would translate U.S. ICBM from a state of complete alerting (with readiness for launch Minutka 1-2) on «modified alert» (with readiness for launch, quantifiable clock) and keeping them in such willingness, when appropriate geopolitical environment, but with the possibility of the return of these forces MDBs to full alert («if there is an order») maturing in a crisis situation. Especially since that transfer SSBN United States from the «modified» alerting to «full» and, conversely, which became operational in the 60s, based its right to exist. In general, the role of «destabilizing» nuclear ICBMs U.S. nuclear triad since 1991 until inexorably reduced.

So, if we take into account the event that the United States never officially renounces nuclear weapons first introduction, it becomes natural that Americans feel compelled retaliation, retaliatory unlikely and unexpected proactive and applicable. U.S. nuclear forces must «ensure the ability to threaten nuclear impressive response in a wide range if deterrence fails.»

Types of nuclear strikes by the triad in the report Defence Minister not found the place for yourself. If we recall the past decade, then the planned four such types: emergency response options, options selective strike options and variations of the main blow strikes on orders / under adaptive planning.

Kinds of wars, the report found a half-hearted minister lighting. If in 2005 the official project document CSC featured such kinds of military conflicts and military operations as a global nuclear war, strategic nuclear operations, nuclear operations in the theater of war, the report in 2013 was named the only global nuclear war, and even then is sense that it has become a distant threat.


South American thermonuclear warhead W87 designed for installation on intercontinental ballistic missiles

U.S. will retain strategic nuclear triad. The level of forces, which would leave USC after the full implementation of the 2018 contract in 2010, will be «more than sufficient for the needs of the United States to fulfill their own goals for national security.» Additional configurations provided for the quantitative composition of forces is not planned. The planned composition of non-strategic nuclear forces and population YABZ for them in the report does not say.

Certain requirements on readiness of nuclear forces plaintext report Defence Minister does not contain (although YAO 2010 foresaw conservation patrols at sea SSBN meaningful amount, bearing alerting nearly all ICBMs targeting the ocean, the rejection of constant combat duty at airbases of heavy bombers with nuclear weapon on board). But the report refers to the possibility of maintaining deployed in advanced areas for regional deterrence strategic nuclear weapon on board of heavy bombers and fighters dual purpose. It should be noted that the report did not intentionally characterized as quantitative ammunition located in Europe nonstrategic YABZ U.S. and composition and the willingness of American fighters based there dual purpose allocated strategic command of NATO operations. Remains closed as much information on the allocation of NATO strategic YABZ (remember to allocate a certain number of NATO YABZ SLBMs U.S. SSBN cool during the war and after its completion).

Declared that «the United States will maintain sohranny, non-hazardous and current nuclear arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and its allies and partners.» «The U.S. policy is to have a compelling force deterrence to be the minimum number YABZ.» In 2013, U.S. President concluded that the ability of non-hazardous for the U.S. reduce the number of deployed strategic countable YABZ this country one third (counting from the number in 1550 YABZ in 2018 under a contract in 2010) and the Russian Federation called for negotiations on such a mutual reduction. Those proven strategic redundancy YABZ (USC in 2012 was about 2,150 deployed strategic YABZ really). In connection with this conclusion, the president must be seen in 2011-2012 in the United States officially investigated the possibility of successive cuts South American nuclear ammunition to the level of 1000-1100, 700-800 and 300-400 YABZ. One can imagine that the thought Bates was so meaningful and incidental purpose — verbovanie for multilateral negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons first in China (up from YABZ 500-1000), and then other countries (up from 300-400 YABZ) . Incidentally, in the same 2011 National Nuclear Security Agency estimates that by 2023 the country’s nuclear ammunition will decrease by 30-40% from 5000 to 3000-3500 active, swing and spare YABZ. Disassembling extra YABZ W78 ICBM, W76-0 SLBMs, W84 GLCM, B61 and B83-0/1 bombs and other YABZ, the U.S. Armed Forces from the level in 5113 YABZ in 2009 came the beginning of 2013 to about 4600 YABZ. But back to the report, in which an important place is given to store («backlog») nondeployed YABZ. Large, although the lowest than at the moment, non-deployed reserve YABZ will be saved in case of unexpected technical or geopolitical nature. One part will be YABZ types that are in service with the strategic nuclear triad, and another — YABZ types «inherited» (legacy weapons).

Foreseen the preservation of «a sufficient number of» non-deployed the armament YABZ on condition that in case of failure YABZ 1st deployed some type or media failure / delivery vehicles of any type could be deployed to change the failed YABZ type non-deployed YABZ other type of grazed. With all of this substitution of nuclear warheads failed type will run as inside each component of the triad, and between its components (possibly based on the interchangeability of W78 and W87 YABZ ICBMs, W76 and W88 on SLBMs YABZ ICBMs and SLBMs YABZ etc. ).

The reader will probably need to calculate the ratio of deployed and non YABZ. «Inherited» non-deployed YABZ be stored in case of failure YABZ undergoing modernization program there to prolong the life, until such time as will not be reached every confidence in luck applets modernization. All these are not deployed, but workable if YABZ geopolitical surprise return to media and delivery systems, increasing their nuclear load.

The report acknowledges the fact that the reserve in the form of «a large number of» non-deployed YABZ survive as revertible capacity for 10 or more years, until the modernized nuclear weapons complex country. The report repeated the assertion that the nuclear powers’ need for numerical equality between the countries is not so much of mandatory, as it was at war cool. » But in the U.S. know about their own advantages in strategic nuclear weapons in the long term (RF meant to catch up to all the characteristics of the contract in 2010 only to 2028).

It is also clear that the United States understands the concern of RF proximity to her nuclear weapons until 5 countries in Asia and the need therefore to have more than the U.S. non-strategic nuclear ammunition. Yet managing U.S. urges Russian negotiations on reduction arsenal not only strategic, and non-strategic YABZ. But to get approval in the country to conduct a one-sided reduction «one third» seems to us a complex matter, and the achievement of a bilateral agreement on such a reduction seems problematic because of the coming years in 2025-2042 complete rearmament U.S. strategic triad closure and modernization of its nuclear ammunition. ;


This paper reports on early premature «planning options nonnuclear strikes» and the impending evaluation «options embedded conventional strikes» (maybe there is an integration of nuclear and non-nuclear strikes?). Despite the fact that non-nuclear weapon and «is not a substitute for nuclear weapons, non-nuclear strikes planning options is a central part of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons.» «Although nuclear weapons and to substantiate that was the main component in guaranteeing U.S. obligations to our allies and partners, the United States still rely primarily on non-nuclear components for strengthening the regional security architecture.» So, of course, that the American shock «Quadriga» non-nuclear forces (kinetic and non-kinetic offensive) displace nuclear triad. «Shagreen skin» nuclear monster gradually reduced.

Small retreat in 1992, when a report to Congress then defense minister and future U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney held a subsequent passage: «Somewhere in the future a nuclear weapon of the Russian Federation no longer be able to be a danger to the United States and its allies; and when that happens, the United States will not have to keep at gunpoint what future Russian favorites will cherish. This would require the possession of Russia … such nuclear forces, which are not threatening to the West (with a small number of nuclear warheads, missiles possessing singly, being in a low degree of readiness), having such ordinary abilities that would not threaten its neighbors. » How many do not want the United States to be completely happy!

It seems basic to «modifications» to the U.S. strategy Piao? In planning Piao counterforce targeting produces displacement kontrtsennostnogo. Reduced role retaliatory strike. When reducing capacity ammunition deployed triad 500 YABZ saved without additional configurations previously provided quantitative composition of the triad and maintained for 10 years as revertible potential huge number of non-deployed YABZ. In an effort to dispel the fear of their own allies and partners in the reliability of the South American «nuclear umbrella», the U.S. declare strengthen regional deterrence by expanding options for responding and non-strategic nuclear weapon triad forces. Recognized that the accumulation of conventional weapons undeniable potential plays a major role in reducing the role of the South American nuclear weapons and that there will be premature beats conventional planning options.

Let’s try to understand the mindset of North Americans on the basis of open-source guidance of the President and Minister of Defense report to Congress on the implementation strategy of nuclear weapons, which became known in June this year.

In the criteria of maintaining strategic stability majestic powers utility huge arsenals of nuclear weapons is reduced, as it can not be used such powers against each other. This event leads to the subsequent consequences: adapt the nuclear forces to the latest situation; transference of real ability introduction of nuclear weapons from the strategic level (majestic powers among themselves) to the regional level (majestic powers against other countries and nuclear terrorism professing various organizations); reduce excess deployed strategic nuclear ammunition and partially refundable create a vacuum force kinetic and non-kinetic non-nuclear means of warfare; keeping just in case a significant number of non-deployed nuclear warheads as revertible building; «Humanization» implementation strategy of nuclear weapons with a temporary waiver of certain types kontrtsennostnogo targeting and focusing on counterforce targeting (mostly against weapons of mass destruction); preference planning efforts introduction of nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence by retaliation, and at regional deterrence to preemptive strike options.

That will be directly contained in prepared sheltered seven locks of real and detailed implementation plans new nuclear weapons the United States happen to find out later. And while constituting the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, acting on the orders of the training command, on a couple of times a day rehearsing conduct nuclear operations previously provided scenarios such operations.
Markell created Fighters

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