In principle, that the campaign will be to the East, it was clear from the very beginning, Hitler was «programmed» to it. The issue was in the other — when? July 22, 1940 F.Galder received puzzle from the commander of the army conceive of different variants of operations against Russia. Initially, the plan developed E.Marks general, he took advantage of a special trust Hitler, it came from the general introductory acquired from Halder. July 31, 1940 at a meeting with General Wehrmacht, Hitler said the overall strategy operations: two main strike first — on the southern strategic direction — toward Kiev and Odessa, the second — on the northern strategic direction — through the Baltic states, to Moscow, in the coming oboestoronny blow from the north and south, and later surgery to master the Caucasus oil fields of Baku.
August 5th Gen. E.Marks prepared initial plan, «Plan Fritz.» According to it, the main attack was from East Prussia and northern Poland to Moscow. In the main assault force, the Army Group «North» had to enter 3 army of 68 divisions (15 of them armored and motorized 2). It was to defeat the reddish Army on the Western Front, to seize the northern part of Europe and the Russian Federation Moscow, then assist in the capture of the southern constellation of Ukraine. Second blow was delivered to Ukraine, Army Group «South» in the two armies, a total of 35 divisions (including 5 armored and motorized 6). Army Group «South» was to defeat the forces of the Red Army in the south-west, cross the capture Kiev and the Dnieper River in the middle reaches. Both groups had to go to the limit: the Arkhangelsk-Bitter-Rostov-on-Don. The reserve was 44 divisions, they had to be concentrated in a band coming of the main strike force — «North». The basic idea was a «lightning war», the Soviet Union planned to destroy the 9 weeks (!) For a suitable script and in the worst-case for 17 weeks.
Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939
Feeble space plan E.Marksa: underestimation of the military might of the Red Army and the Soviet Union as a whole; overestimation of their own abilities, that is, the Wehrmacht; tolerance response in a number of the enemy, so underestimated the capabilities of military and political control in the organization of defense, counter-attacks, the extra hope for the destruction of municipal and political system, economy country in the western regions of rejection. Excluded the ability to restore the economy and the army after the first reverses. USSR confused with Russia in 1918, when the collapse in front of a small German troops by rail could capture large areas. Was not designed scenario in case of momentary escalation of the war in a protracted war. In short, the plan suffered recklessness bordering on suicide. These errors were not eradicated and later.
Thus, the German intelligence failed to correctly assess the defense of the USSR and its military, economic, moral, political, and spiritual potentials. Tyazheleyschie mistakes were made in assessing the strength of the Red Army, its surge capacity, quantity and quality characteristics of our air force and armored forces. Thus, according to intelligence Reich, one year of the establishment of the Soviet Union aircraft in 1941 amounted to 3,500-4,000 aircraft, in effect from January 1, 1939 on June 22, 1941 the Red Army Air Force received 17,745 aircraft, of their 3719 new designs.
In illusions «blitzkrieg» were top commanders of the Reich and so, August 17, 1940 at a meeting at the headquarters of the High Command, Keitel called «the crime of attempted creation in the current time of production capacity, which will give effect only after 1941. You can only invest in a company which is required to merit the goal and give the respective effect. «
Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939
The forthcoming development
The subsequent elaboration of the plan assigned to General F.Paulyusu who was promoted to assistant chief of staff of the Army. In addition, Hitler connected to the work of the generals who were to become the chiefs of staff of the army groups. They had to independently examine the problem of. By September 17, the work has been completed and Paulus could generalize the results. October 29, he gave a memo: «On the ground plan of operations against Russia.» It emphasized that the need to achieve a surprise attack, and for this to create and implement measures to deceive the enemy. Specifies whether to prevent the Russian border forces move to surround and kill them in the frontier zone.
At this time, were the development of the war plan in the headquarters of the operational management of the High Command. At the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Jodl them engaged B.Lossberg. By 15 September, he presented his own plan for the war, many of his ideas into the final plan for the war: momentary kill the main forces of the Red Army, to prevent their departure to the east, Russia to cut off the western seas — the Baltic and the Dark, a foothold in this turn, which has permitted to take important areas of the European part of Russia, becoming all that barrier against its Asian part. This development has portrayed three army groups «North», «Center» and «South». And the Army Group «Center» received a huge part of motorized and armored forces, lupila on Moscow via Minsk and Smolensk. At a delay of «North», which lupila in the direction of Leningrad, the troops of «Center», after the capture of Smolensk, had to throw some of the forces on the northern route. Army Group «South» was to break the enemy’s troops, surrounding them, to take over Ukraine, to cross the Dnieper, on the northern flank of his leave on contact with the southern flank of the «Center». In the war dragged Finland and Romania: Finnish-German separate task force was to advance on Leningrad, Murmansk on the part of the forces. Finite limit promote the Wehrmacht. Was to determine the fate of the Union, will there be an internal tragedy. As well as in terms of Paulus, great attention was paid to the factor of surprise attack.
Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus (1890-1957).
Meeting of the General Staff (1940). The meeting at the table with a map (left to right): Chief of the Wehrmacht Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the Land Forces, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder.
The plan «Otto»
In the upcoming development continued, the plan specifies, November 19 plan, code-title «Otto», was subjected to examination in chief of the Army Brauchitsch. Approved it without any substantive comments. December 5, 1940 a plan was presented to Adolf Hitler, the ultimate purpose of the coming of the three army groups were identified Arkhangelsk and the Volga. Hitler had approved it. From November 29 to December 7, 1940 the plan was carried out a war game.
December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive number 21, the plan received the symbolic title of «Barbarossa». The ruler Frederick Redbeard was to begin the series of hikes in the East. For privacy, the plan made only in 9 copies. For the same privacy armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland had to get certain tasks just before the war. Preparations for war were due to graduate May 15, 1941.
Walther von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941
The essence of the plan «Barbarossa»
— The idea of «lightning war» and unexpected blow. The ultimate goal for the Wehrmacht: line Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan.
— The maximum concentration of forces the Army and Air Force. Destruction of the Red Army troops as a result of bold, profound and rapid action tank «wedges». The Luftwaffe had to eliminate the possibility of effective operation of the Russian Air Force at the beginning of the operation.
— Navy did ancillary tasks: support for the Wehrmacht from the sea, prevention of breakthrough Russian Navy from the Baltic Sea, the coast guard’s own, to forge their actions Russian naval forces, providing shipping in the Baltic Sea and the northern flank of the Wehrmacht’s supply of the sea.
— Beat in the three strategic directions: north — Baltic-Leningrad, central — Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow South — Kiev-Volga. The main attack was in the central direction.
Not counting the number 21 of the Directive on 18 December 1940, there were other documents: directives and orders of the strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, concealment, deception, prepare the theater of military operations, etc. For example, 31 January 1941 entered directive OKH (Army General Staff) strategic concentration and deployment of troops, 15 February 1941 there was an order of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command disguise.
A huge impact on the plan had personally Adolf Hitler, he specifically endorsed the advent of 3-army group in order to capture the fundamental economic regions of the USSR, insisted on increased attention — a zone of the Baltic Sea and the Dark, the inclusion in the operational planning of the Urals and the Caucasus. He paid great attention to the southern strategic direction — Grain Ukraine, Donbass, strategic importance of the Volga, the oil of the Caucasus.
The impact force, the army group, other groups
To strike were allocated a large force: 190 divisions, of them 153 German (including 33 armored and motorized), 37 infantry divisions, Finland, Romania, Hungary, two-thirds of the Reich Air Force, Navy forces, air forces and naval forces of Germany’s allies. The reserve Command Berlin has left only 24 divisions. And then in the west and south-east were divisions with limited abilities shock created for the protection and safety. The only mobile reserve had two armored brigades in France, armed with captured tanks.
In the Army Group «Center» — commanded by F. Bock, she put the brunt — included two field armies — the 9th and 4th, two tank groups — 3rd and 2nd, a total of 50 divisions and two brigades, supported by 2nd Air Force. She had to flank attacks (two tank groups) to commit a profound breakthrough south and north of Minsk, surround a large group of Russian forces, between Bialystok and Minsk. After the defeat of Russian forces surrounded and entry limit Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk considered two scenarios: first, if a group of armies «North» will not be able to defeat the forces opposing it, to bring against their tank groups, and field armies must continue to move to Moscow; second, if the group «North» all goes well, by all means attack on Moscow.
Fedor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940
Army Group «North» commanded by Field Marshal Leeb, it included the 16th and 18th Field Army Panzer Group 4, only 29 divisions, with the support of the 1st Air Fleet. She had to defeat the forces opposing it, grab the Baltic ports, Leningrad, the base of the Baltic Fleet. Then, together with the Finnish Army and slung from Norway breaks the resistance of the German parts of the Russian forces in the north of European Russia.
Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940
Army Group «South», which lupila south Pripyatskih marshes, commanded by Field Marshal G.Rundshtedt. It included: 6th, 17th, 11th Field Army, 1st Panzer Group, 3rd and 4th Romanian Army, Hungarian movable structure, with the support of the 4th Air Fleet Reich and Romania, and the Air Force Hungary. Total — 57 divisions and 13 brigades of their 13 Romanian divisions, nine Romanian and four Hungarian brigades. Rundstedt had to keep coming to Kiev, split the Red Army in Galicia, in the west of Ukraine, to seize the crossing of the Dnieper, creating preconditions for further offensive action. To do this, the 1st Panzer Group in cooperation with the parts of the 17th and the 6th Army was to break through the defenses in the area between Rawa Russa and Kovel, going through Zhitomir and Berdichev, go to the Dnieper River in Kiev and the south. Then hit along the Dnieper River in the south-east direction, to cut off the forces of the Red Army, operating in western Ukraine, and kill them. At this time, the 11th Army was to do with Russian control visibility of head impact with the terrain of Romania, pinning down the forces of the Red Army and thwarting their care Dniester.
The Romanian Army (plan «Munich») were also constrain Russian troops break through the defense on the site Tsutsora, New Bedrazh.
Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939
In Finland and Norway has been focused German army «Norway» and two Finnish army of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet Reich and the Finnish Air Force. Finnish units were to forge a reddish Army Petrozavodsk in Karelian and direct ions. When leaving the Army Group «North» to limit the Luga River, the Finns had to start strong coming on the Karelian Isthmus and between Onega and Ladoga lake to unite with the Germans on the Svir River and the Leningrad area, they have had to accept the role in the capture of the second the capital of the Union, the city has (or rather, the area, the city planned to kill, and the population «recycle») go to Finland. The German army «Norway» forces 2-reinforced hulls had to deploy coming to Murmansk and Kandalaksha. After the fall of Kandalaksha and exit to the white south sea shell was to advance northward along the railroad and in conjunction with the North Corps capture Murmansk, Polar, destroying the Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula.
Discussion of the situation and giving orders to one of the German units immediately before the attack, the 22.06.1941
The overall plan «Barbarossa», as well as of early development, has been avantyuristichen and built on several «ifs.» If the Soviet Union — a «colossus with feet of clay», if the Wehrmacht was able to fulfill all right and just in time, if we can kill the main forces of the Red Army in the border «fired» if the industry, the economy of the Soviet Union will not be able to operate normally after the loss of the western regions, especially Ukraine. Economy, army, Allies were not prepared for the likely long war. There was no strategic plan in the event of failure of the blitzkrieg. In the end, when the blitzkrieg failed, we had to improvise.
Plan to attack the German Wehrmacht on the Russian Alliance, June 1941
The suddenness of the attack — an instrument of aggression. Moscow, 2002.
Criminal purposes Nazi Germany in the war against the Russian Union. Documents and materials. Moscow, 1987.